

Major General Keys commanded the 2d Marine Division. With the U.S. Army's Tiger Brigade attached, the 2d Division packed more combat power than any other division in Marine Corps history. In this interview, General Keys discusses the experience of the 2d Marine Division in the Persian Gulf conflict, including the last minute decision to have the 2d Division create its own breach through the Iraqi defenses.

Rolling With the 2d Marine Division

interview with Lieutenant General William M. Keys, USMC

U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, November 1991

Proceedings: The Marine Corps bases on the West Coast started emptying out almost immediately, once the balloon went up. What was going on at Camp Lejeune?

Keys: Everyone was tracking the situation, and some units were getting ready to go. Initially, all that mounted out was the 4th MEB [Marine Expeditionary Brigade], which was in process of loading out for Norway, to conduct an annual NATO exercise in the Teamwork series. After a little reconfiguring, they deployed to the Indian Ocean.

The ground combat element of the 4th MEB was the 2d Marine Regiment, which left me with two infantry regiments--the 6th Marines and 8th Marines. Since it was quite possibly headed for combat, we let the 4th MEB go out a lot heavier than we should have--particularly in the combat service support elements. I guess we figured that someday we'd link up out there, but I never saw the 2d Marines again, for the duration of Desert Shield and Desert Storm. In the meantime they were floating around with assets that the rest of us would need when the time arrived for us to mount out. There's a lesson in there somewhere.

Between August and December, we tried to track developments in Southwest Asia through situation reports and intelligence briefs. We received several warning orders that were later canceled: first, to send another regiment; next, to mount out another MEB, this one designated to marry up with gear carried into the theater of operations by an MPS [Maritime Prepositioning Ships] squadron. Late in November, we got the word that the entire 2d Marine Division would go over there and fight under command of I MEF [Marine Expeditionary Force], which in effect would become a corps-level command.

When we received the mount-out order, I still had the two active-duty regiments--the 6th Marines and the 8th Marines. The rest of the 2d Division was filled out with reserves, about 4,000 of them. We filled up our holes and

added an extra Reserve tank battalion. We had a comprehensive individual training program for each reservist: rifle range, gas mask, Code of Conduct--the whole works. At the same time, we were giving the same training to the reservists who were destined to join the 1st Marine Division, already deployed to Southwest Asia. We put about 15,000 reservists through this program in roughly one month. Camp Lejeune looked like it must have looked during World War II, with Marines reporting at all hours of the day and night, finding temporary billeting in a tent or barracks, then starting out the first thing next morning to train for combat.

We began flying the 2d Division to Saudi Arabia around 12 December. The shipping for our heavy gear and supplies (one MPS squadron plus 18 break-bulk ships) had begun sailing around the last of November and continued through December. All our gear had arrived by the middle of January; all the troops were there by year's end.


Proceedings: Then you got some reinforcements in Saudi Arabia, didn't you?

Keys: We took operational control of a U.S. Army tank brigade--the "Tiger Brigade" [1st Brigade, 2nd Armored Division]. They came fully equipped with M-1 tanks and were a first-class outfit. They had been together as a unit for about two years, and had been through the National Training Center [the Army's stateside equivalent of the Marine Air-Ground Combat Center in the Mojave Desert]. Their commander and officers really knew their stuff.

We spent the first few days getting to know each other, getting briefed on each other's procedures. That was much less of a problem than you might think. We go to their schools; they go to our schools. A lot of our training and doctrine is the same. Before long, we were one tight division. Right at the beginning, I told the Tiger Brigade that they were my third regiment, and would be treated the same as the other two. This made a great difference to them and paid off greatly later. Those Army tankers now wear the 2d Marine Division patch on their right sleeves--to signify their service with the Marines in combat. At the time we assumed operational control, they were located about 80 miles away, in a relatively good training area. I saw no point in moving them closer, so they stayed there until the first week in January and conducted their own training exercises. We'd go down there to observe and to coordinate some things with them that I wanted to do.

Proceedings: When did you begin moving toward your eventual attack positions?

Keys: About 28 December, the first elements of the division moved north. I wanted to move units into the field as soon as they got their equipment, and get on with some serious training. We moved into a place called the Triangle area--which was in fact a triangle, lying between three hard-topped roads--about 50 miles north of Al Jubayl. Within two weeks, the entire division was up at the Triangle.



We built a training range that could handle all the weapons of a mechanized and armored assault force, and we developed a complex of obstacles for use in training for breaching operations. In addition to their other work, every unit went through a standard syllabus that took about five training days. About the middle of January, we moved northwest to the left of the 1st Marine Division, about 12 miles below the border with Kuwait. We stayed there about two weeks, and--as we did everywhere we stopped--we kept on training. This is where we had our first significant contact with Iraqi forces. Some of our light armored vehicles had a skirmish with Iraqi tanks along the border and killed five, as I recall.

Proceedings: What were the Iraqis doing at this time? Were they trying to run any probes, any reconnaissance missions?

Keys: They would come up to the border at night, and if they did anything beyond that, it didn't go very deep. It was the same with us. CentCom didn't want anybody in the I MEF sector launching combat-reconnaissance missions into Kuwait at this point. The concern was starting the ground war early.

Proceedings: What was your scheme of maneuver at this time?

Keys: Our plans changed as circumstances changed. About the first week of February, General [Walter E.] Boomer [Commanding General, I Marine Expeditionary Force] approved a plan that called for the 1st Marine Division to conduct the breaching operation. The 2d Division would pass through the 1st Division's lines and become the exploitation force. At the time, we were driven to the one-division breach concept of operations because we didn't seem to have enough heavy breaching equipment to support two divisions.

There were many, many problems associated with this plan. For one, it was difficult to get the two divisions together for training and rehearsing. When we finally did some passage-of-lines rehearsing, it did not go well. Since both divisions were heavily mechanized, we might have had a column of vehicles stretching back 30 miles, just getting lined up for the attack. I personally did not care for this plan, but would have supported it if we were driven to it by the lack of breaching equipment.

But by 7 or 8 February, some additional equipment from the Israelis and the U.S. Army had arrived. In addition, my Tiger Brigade had some built-in breaching capability, and knew how to use it--in fact, they gave us a lot of help in planning the entire assault. So I went to General Boomer and asked him to consider my alternative plan. He agreed, and I showed him what I wanted to do. It was rather radical. It called for moving the 2d Division another 80 miles to the northwest and breaching right through one of the Iraqi oil fields. The field we picked was supposedly one of the worst, because of heavy concentrations of hydrogen gas. But we had two or three Kuwaiti resistance fighters with us, and one--who had worked in that field--said that we could probably get through it. If things got too bad, we could always use our gas masks. They were not the most effective filtering devices for hydrogen, but they would do in a crunch.

As I presented this plan to General Boomer, I related my confidence in my subordinate unit commanders and the Marines and soldiers of the 2d Division and I guess it showed through--because he approved the plan (pending General Schwarzkopf's approval). This brought about a major change in the I MEF concept of operations.

Proceedings: It also brought about a major change in the logistical support concept, didn't it?

Keys: It sure did. Brigadier General [C.C.] Chuck Krulak [commanding the Direct Support Command] was there, and General Boomer asked him if he could support the new plan. Chuck said he could, but not from his current location. So in two weeks he carved out a massive logistical support area in the desert, where he was able to support both divisions. I just want to add this about General Krulak and his Direct Support Command. They were right up there with us the entire way, and we owe a large part of our success in the attack to Chuck Krulak as an individual and to the superb performers in his command.

Next, General [H. Norman] Schwarzkopf [Commanding General, the Central Command] came down. We briefed him and he said the plan sounded good. So we were cleared for action. As another aside, I think General Schwarzkopf was a superlative commander--a commander's commander. You could just tell that he knew what he was doing. He instilled a lot of confidence in his general officers. I have a lot of respect for the man as an individual, a soldier, and a commander.

Proceedings: What happened next?


Keys: I directed the 6th Marine Regiment to prepare to conduct the breach. We would do a one-regiment breach, with each battalion, in turn, cutting two lanes through the barrier. We moved the 6th Marines into a sterile area and started to construct an exact replica of the barrier line that we would have to breach. We gathered all the intelligence we could on the area. We sent people back to CentCom headquarters, and we even sent the Division Engineer back to the Defense Intelligence Agency in Washington, D.C., for anything they could find. From photos and imagery we developed a schematic map with a scale of 1:25,000.

The Division Engineers did a superb job of building a barrier to scale, in a short time. Then their commanding officer, Colonel Larry Livingston, Commanding Officer of the 6th Marines, took his units through, battalion by battalion. After one week of training, he reported that he was ready to go. I can't say enough about the way he put it all together.

Next, we moved everybody some 80 miles to the breach area. Our moves over there were mostly self-moves. I had an extra truck company attached to the division, and a total of 672 trucks at my disposal--and I needed every one of them. At times when I needed more, I could rely on our Force Service Support Group and even contracted civilian trucks--but as we got closer to the war, the civilian trucks got less dependable. My point is that--especially in the desert--you need trucks and logistical vehicles to accomplish your mission, and the only vehicles you can count on in every situation are the ones that actually belong to you.

Proceedings: Once you got near the breach site, how did you organize your forces for the attack?

Keys: I put the division in a laydown site, in the order they would go into the assault. The 6th Marines were right in front of the area to be breached. The second unit through would be the Tiger Brigade, followed by the 8th Marines. I sent the Army tank brigade second--to lead the exploitation forces--because they were totally equipped with night-vision devices. The Marines were limited in this regard, but every soldier had what he needed and every Army vehicle had what it needed, and it was the best gear on the market. They truly had an exceptional night-fighting capability, and it made a difference. My thinking was that if the initial penetration by the 6th Marines went slowly, and dragged into



late afternoon or evening, the Tiger Brigade could move up and complete the breach during hours of darkness.

My overall aim was to push as much combat power as possible through those two breach lanes, as quickly as possible. Going into the assault, the 2d Marine Division had a strength of about 20,500, with 257 tanks, including 185 M-1s. It was probably the heaviest Marine division--with the most combat power--ever to take the field.


The assault was scheduled for 22 February. General Schwarzkopf asked if we'd be ready to go. I said, "Yes. I'd like to have more time, but I'll be ready to go into the assault then, if that's the date."

He said, "What I'm more concerned about is the weather."

We delayed the assault for two days, waiting for better weather. The weather just got worse. So we put our heads down and kicked off the assault

on 24 February, even though the weather was still rotten. The night before, we had made 18 cuts in the berm line with artillery, so we were ready for a fast start. But the morning fog was so dense that we couldn't see 100 yards ahead. With visibility that bad, we couldn't count on much in the way of close air support—but we punched on through. Contrary to some reports, the Iraqis were still there, waiting for us. They fired about 300 rounds of artillery as we worked to breach the minefields, but they had no forward observers to coax the fire on target, so we could discount the prospect of heavy casualties from their shots in the dark. Aside from mines, Iraqi artillery had been my major concern, so I felt early on that we were off to a good start.

We punched on through the barrier, and by the evening of the first day all of the 6th Marines, the Tiger Brigade, and four battalions of artillery had moved through the breach. The following morning, I brought the 8th Marines through,



and we prepared to continue the attack that afternoon with the Tiger Brigade on the left, the 6th Marines in the center, and the 8th Marines on the right. Light armored vehicles, which had entered Kuwait early (CentCom's policy had changed late in the game), performed scouting and reconnaissance missions on the left flank, while units from the division's reconnaissance battalion screened the right flank.

I need to digress again. The light armored vehicles, in their first combat test with the Marines, really proved their worth--shooting and moving, shooting and moving. They killed more Iraqi tanks than we realized at first, and they took the first Iraqi prisoners. An Iraqi general we captured on the second day told us that he misidentified the first infiltration of light armored vehicles as the main armored attack, even though we had planned it as more of a diversionary attack.

Intelligence sources told us that we would probably come into contact with the 80th Iraqi Tank Brigade, their operational reserve force, attacking into our center. But large-scale attacks never materialized, and we now think that the 80th Brigade was just folded back into the Iraqi 5th Mechanized Division, which both the 1st and 2d Marine Divisions eventually chopped to pieces.


We captured 5,000 Iraqi prisoners the first day. They would take us under fire. We would return fire with effect--killing a few--and then they would just quit. That proved to be the pattern for the entire 100-hour war. Once we took them under heavy fire, they'd fire a few more rounds, then quit.

On the morning of the third day, General Boomer cleared me to drive on Kuwait City, using the Tiger Brigade to envelop to the west, sealing off an area called Al Jahar. Around 1000 that morning, I called in my subordinate commanders to give them mission-type orders. I didn't give them much time to prepare, but they still managed to jump off around noontime. When we got within ten miles of Kuwait City, I cut the Tiger Brigade loose to envelop to the left. They sealed a major intersection on the escape route to Iraq, and trapped thousands of fleeing Iraqis. By the evening of the third day, we were poised to enter the city the next morning. In the morning, the word came down: "Don't go."

The Coalition forces from the region had been selected to enter Kuwait City. The following evening, we met with them at Al Jahar, to coordinate the passage of lines. We held onto a line called the Six-Ring Road; they passed through our lines and entered the city. That was the plan all along.

Proceedings: What about the timing of the cease-fire?

Keys: I think it probably came at the right time. At least it seemed that way when the word came down. In retrospect, it is clear that we could have done a lot more damage to the Iraqi forces if we had pressed on more quickly. It now appears that they started bugging out of Kuwait as soon as we crossed the southern border. But at the time it would not have made sense to expose our forces to counterattacks by overextending ourselves, under the assumption that



the enemy would never fight. That's how it looked at division level, anyway. Overall, I tend to agree with the President: If we had pursued the retreating forces into Iraq, we'd still be in Iraq now--and would probably be there for the next hundred years. We didn't manage to nail the major culprit in all of this, but we did what we had set out to do.

Proceedings: A few questions still linger, after the war. How effective was your intelligence support?

Keys: At the strategic level, it was fine. But we did not get enough tactical intelligence--front-line battle intelligence. The RPV [remotely piloted vehicle] worked very well, but we needed many more of them, plus systems to disseminate their information to all units that needed it. In my opinion, the RPV is going to be our best tactical intelligence-gathering vehicle in the future, and we need to develop that program.

Our electronic warfare assets--for example, the Radio Battalion--worked very well. We also received a lot of information from Marine aviation. They'd fly a mission, and when they got back they'd immediately call the division's combat operations center to report whatever they saw. That was close to real-time intelligence support.

I guess that our biggest overall intelligence shortcoming was in building Saddam Hussein and his forces into a monster that just wasn't there. Going into the battle, this made us more gunshy than we should have been. Certainly, the Iraqis had more equipment and capability than any force we've ever faced. But the fighting spirit just was not there. The individual foot-soldiers were badly abused by their leaders--not necessarily their military leaders, but their government--and low morale was the result. I think their senior military leaders knew what they were doing. After we seized Kuwait City, we uncovered several sand tables depicting their defenses that were incredibly detailed. They were fully prepared for us. They had thousands of weapons and millions of rounds of small-arms and tank ammunition--so they could have put up one hell of a fight if they had wanted to. Their defensive areas were well organized, and had they chosen to put their hearts into it, we would have had a real fight on our hands.

I guess it all boils down to the fact that the individual Iraqi soldier did not measure up to, say, the North Vietnamese soldier. The Iraqis were not ready to die for what they believed in--whatever that was.

And that's it in a nutshell.

Brigadier General Krulak commanded the 2d Force Service Support Group, based in Camp Lejeune, North Carolina, when Desert Shield began. In Saudi Arabia, this unit and the 1st Force Service Support Group pooled their resources into a single logistical support effort. General Krulak commanded the Direct Support Command, which was responsible for the direct logistical support of frontline units.

A War of Logistics

interview with Brigadier General Charles C. Krulak, USMC

U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, November 1991

Proceedings: When did you start to crank things up for the move?

Krulak: In the fall of 1990, the word came down to prepare for a rotation of forces in Saudi Arabia. We would be relieving the 1st FSSG, which had begun to arrive there in August and had stood up its headquarters early in September. We began to run a series of command-post exercises, to simulate the laydown of the 1st FSSG forces in Southwest Asia. As I began to place my people on the map, the way [Brigadier General] Jim Brabham had his situated on the ground, I decided that if a rotation of forces was ordered, I'd try to take my entire FSSG. Jim had taken a slice of his headquarters from the 1st FSSG in Camp Pendleton and placed it on top of two composited brigade service support groups that had entered Saudi Arabia with the 7th and 1st Marine Expeditionary Brigades. He and his people were doing a superb job, but as we continued to run our command-post exercises it became obvious that if we shifted to offensive operations, we would need the more extensive command-and-control capability of a full FSSG. When the word came that we were going to reinforce the 1st FSSG--and not replace it by rotation--I stuck to the same concept of going to Southwest Asia with a full FSSG.

Once we got there, we established ourselves as a Direct Support Command, with the 1st FSSG assuming the general support role. Jim Brabham, who was senior to me, became the senior Marine logistician in country. Just before Christmas, Lieutenant General [Walter E.] Boomer directed me to locate a place up north where we could start putting in a logistic support area, big enough to support a division-sized breach of the Iraqi barriers and minefields along the southern border of Kuwait. I went north and found a place called Kibrit, about 50 kilometers inland from Al Mish'ab. It was an old, abandoned runway--very desolate. After I reported my find to General Boomer, he gave me the go-ahead to set up a combat service support area, with seven days of ammo and supplies to support the attack. I sent up my big earth-moving equipment, and by 2 February 1991 Kibrit was ready to go. It had a big fuel farm, the largest

ammunition supply point in Marine Corps history, and all the supplies I MEF needed for the attack into Kuwait.

Proceedings: Seven days for a Marine division--that's a lot of ammunition. . .

Krulak: In this case, we're talking about seven days for two Marine divisions, plus the Army's armored Tiger Brigade, which was operating with the 2d Marine Division. Those forces generate a very large ammunition requirement, which made this staging operation one heck of a gamble on General Boomer's part. Why? Because we were staging our ammo far forward of any Marine ground forces. But General Boomer wanted to ensure that he had his support up where it would do him some good when the push into Kuwait began. At the time we started to build up Kibrit, the 1st and 2d Marine Divisions were some 100 kilometers south of us. They did not come north until late January 1991. North of Kibrit, all we had was a screening force of Saudis and Qatars. At the time of the Iraqi move on the abandoned coastal town of Khafji, we were still the northernmost Marines in town, although Major General [William M.] Keys and the 2d Marine Division were by then only ten miles or so to our southwest.

The Iraqi attack on Khafji was three-pronged, and we were in danger of being attacked. I took every bit of ground defense I had and put it around the ammo dump. I felt that I could lose everything but the ammo. If we lost that, our offensive capability would cease to exist. I called General Keys and he sent up some reinforcements from the Tiger Brigade, who screened us for the next few days while the Khafji fight was going on. Those were interesting times, as the Chinese might say. [EDITOR'S NOTE: "May you live in interesting times" is regarded by the Chinese as a curse.]

Proceedings: So the Kibrit gamble paid off . . .

Krulak: The whole support problem was simple, as long as we were at Kibrit. It was only 50 kilometers from the coast--handy for ammunition resupply. In addition, it had its own water source--a well of its own. But things changed. For the logisticians, the war didn't begin on G-Day--24 February--with the start of the ground assault; it really began about three weeks earlier, when General Boomer decided to breach the Iraqi defenses in two places with two Marine divisions, instead of a single breach with one division.

On or about 4 February, I went to see General Keys. I had been his assistant division commander at one time, so it was no big deal--I just dropped by. Entering his tent, I saw General Boomer, as well. They were looking intently at a map.

General Boomer looked up at me and asked, "What would you think of a two-division breach?"

Well, I had thought about that possibility a lot, as had most of the general officers out there. I went through the laundry list of reasons to do it: complicating the enemy's defensive problem by attacking on two fronts; avoiding a

passage of lines, especially if the sole breaching attack bogged down; making better use of supporting arms--all of the things Marines think about. But I wasn't telling General Boomer anything he didn't already know. He looked at me and said, "Yes, I agree and we're thinking about doing it."

Then he said, "And I'm thinking about doing it here." He put his hand on the map--not on the southern part, but the western part--maybe 150 kilometers northwest of Kibrit. Then he said, "Can you support that?" [EDITOR'S NOTE: About 40 years earlier, Brigadier General Krulak's father, then the G-3 (Operations) Officer of the Fleet Marine Force, Pacific, was asked whether the Marines could provide a division to reinforce embattled forces in Korea, as requested by General Douglas MacArthur. Then-Colonel (later Lieutenant General Victor Krulak let his faith in the Marines override the discouraging numbers then at his disposal, and said that the Corps could support. Within three months, the 1st Marine Division, with two of its three regiments comprised mostly of reservists, landed at Inchon and changed the course of the war.]

I thought to myself, "I'm not sure I can support that!" But what I said was, "I know I can't support that from Kibrit. I need to find another location for the combat service support area."

"Okay, go look for another place," General Boomer said.

I went back to my staff and they went out and looked. They came back and said, "There's a location called the Gravel Plains, about nine miles west of the Kuwait border, which would be perfect to support General Boomer's scheme of maneuver," they said.



We had our new spot. I named it Al Khanjar--the dagger. We started building this miracle in the desert on 6 February and had it completed by 0100 on 20 February. Al Khanjar encompassed 11,280 acres--just think of it. The ammunition supply point alone covered 780 acres, with 151 separate cells for ammunition stowage--protected by some 24 miles of berm. One stray artillery round wouldn't burn up the whole works, as happened more than once in Vietnam. We also had 5,000,000 gallons of fuel on deck at Al Khanjar, the largest fuel point the Marine Corps had ever seen. We also had 1,000,000 gallons of water stowed there--as well as the third-largest Navy hospital in the world, in terms of operating rooms. In deference to Iraqi artillery capabilities, all of this was dug in--none of it was above ground.

During those 14 days, the 8th Motor Transport Battalion drove more than a million miles. Back at Camp Lejeune, 8th Motors drives roughly half a million miles a year. During those two weeks, the engines of the trucks, the bulldozers, the road graders, and other key vehicles were never turned off. We just replaced the drivers. Despite the heavy equipment operating tempo, our equipment readiness rate for the period remained above 94%.

Proceedings: No overheating?

Krulak: No. It was just amazing. And during this time frame, we were also assisting the SeaBees in building Khanjar International Airport (in reality, two C-130 airstrips), and helping the air wing build Lonesome Dove, a large helicopter support facility. We also built the Khanjar Expressway, a four-lane superhighway through the desert, running from the breach sites through both division areas, and back to Khanjar. At the end of those two weeks, we had 15 days of supply at Khanjar, three days with each of the direct support groups, and a day with each of the mobile combat service support detachments--in addition to whatever the divisions were carrying themselves.

I'm not a logistician by trade, so I set this up from a infantryman's viewpoint: "How would a division commander want to be resupplied?"

The answer was fairly obvious. If I shot a bullet, I'd want to reach back and have someone hand another bullet to me, so I could stay on the line. I wouldn't like having to drop my rifle and leave the firing line, in order to go back and get another bullet. I wouldn't even want to take the time to ask for another bullet; it should just show up automatically. What that implies, of course, is that the guy who supplies me the bullet and the guy who eventually brings up more bullets for him to give to me both must be able to keep up with me, the bullet-shooter. The intent was that the user would never experience any loss of capability. It was a total "push" system.

Proceedings: As opposed to a "pull" system, where the user has to request resupply . . .

Krulak: Total push. Nobody requested anything. Each regiment of the 2d Marine Division had its own mobile combat service support detachment, with

a day's worth of all classes of supply, moving right along with it. Each task force in the 1st Marine Division had the same setup. If a machine gun went down, we wouldn't keep the gunner waiting while we tried to fix it; we'd just pull a replacement off the rack of machine guns the detachment carried, and hand it to that gunner. The same thing would apply if we lost a wire-guided missile launcher or a light armored vehicle. We had detachments from the maintenance battalion up forward, and they would begin repairing equipment immediately, but no one had to wait while they worked. This responsiveness of the combat service support system was something new--and it worked.

Proceedings: Was your medical support geared to work far forward, in the same way?

Krulak: We had surgical support--trauma specialists--right up with the mobile combat service support detachments. They could sort casualties out and perform immediate lifesaving procedures--the same as regular surgeons, only more capable. Then, with the direct support groups, right up there on the border, we had the casualty collecting and clearing companies in place. Behind them, we had the trauma centers--at Al Khanjar, Kibrit, and Al Mish'ab.

We thought that if we were going to take a lot of casualties, it would be during the early stages of the breaching operations, so we kept our surgical support teams up close to the advancing units and planned for overland evacuation of casualties to the rear. As things turned out, we had relatively few casualties and helicopters could in fact fly over the battlefield, so we loaded our medevacs at a forward landing zone--just like Vietnam--and overflew the border medical facilities to take the casualties directly back to Al Khanjar. It wasn't that far--you could actually see the border from Al Khanjar.

We were set up to handle a worst-case situation. Each of the mobile support detachments had a collecting and clearing company mounted on trucks. If we started taking casualties, we could have driven up there and set up operating rooms right next to the battle. Everything was mobile and ready to go. Thank God we didn't have to use that capability.

Proceedings: Desert Storm was probably the first time since World War I that Marines faced the possibility of mass casualties from chemical or biological attacks. How did that affect the way you set things up?

Krulak: It played a major role. It required us to stage a lot more water, because that's what we were going to use for decontamination. We brought up as many water-carrying vehicles as we could. They weren't all tanker trucks; they were anything that could carry containers of water. All the mobile support detachments had decon water with them, as did the collecting and clearing companies and the hospitals. Wherever we set up to treat casualties we had decontamination water nearby. If you bring a contaminated casualty into an operating room, you wipe out that OR--and we just couldn't have that.

Also preparing for the worst case, we had the surgeons, wearing individual protective clothing, practice dealing with contaminated casualties.

Proceedings: How did the combat service support troops hold up under the high tempo of operations?

Krulak: They did fine. The infantrymen--and I'm one--train in specific tactics for specific missions that have a beginning and an end. But every day is the same for a wrench-turner. He might be working on hard stand back at Camp Lejeune or in the sand of Saudi Arabia, but he still turns that wrench the same way every day. So getting our guys up to speed for their combat service support jobs in the desert was relatively easy compared, say, to training and equipping the 1st and 2d Marine Divisions to make those historic breaches of the Iraqi barriers and minefields.

For us, the really different thing was that nobody had ever mounted out a full force service support group before. Most thought it couldn't be done. But we deployed as a full FSSG to Al Jubayl, moved to Al Mish'ab, from there to Kibrit, from there to Al Khanjar, and then on to Al Jaber, in Kuwait. Then we rolled back to Al Khanjar, then to Kibrit, then to Al Mish'ab, and finally back to Al Jubayl. The whole shooting match--the whole damned FSSG. That is something to accomplish!

Proceedings: Back at Camp Lejeune, the FSSG would have its share of female Marines, doing everything from punching typewriters to running heavy earth-moving equipment. As you moved farther and farther forward in a combat environment, did you have to make allowances for the females, and leave them in the rear?

Krulak: We took all of them with us. They were magnificent. The first Marine out of the 2d FSSG to be recommended for a Bronze Star medal was a woman. My G-1 [personnel officer] was a female lieutenant colonel; my G-2 [intelligence officer] was a female major. The noncommissioned officer in charge of our communications center was a woman; 50% of the communications watch sections were women. We had female platoon commanders. After dark on the first day of the ground attack, ten of my female truck drivers went through the breach to bring back enemy prisoners, so they actually cleared the breach ahead of some of our hard-charging infantry units. I had a couple hundred female Marines up north with me, and none of them ever shied away from anything. None of them went home on emergency leave--zero! None of them got pregnant in Southwest Asia--zero! The women, as well as the Marine Corps Reservists, did a truly phenomenal job.

I'm a firm believer in the capabilities of our female Marines to perform under pressure. I'm not saying that they should be infantrymen, but there is a role for them in combat--certainly in the combat service support arena. They did a great job.

Proceedings: Is there a question I didn't ask that you would like to answer?

Krulak: I've been an infantry officer for 26 of my 27 years in the Marine Corps. But as a temporary logistician, I have never been prouder of any group of men and women than my FSSG. Nobody who was not there will ever know what it took to build the support area at Al Khanjar. General Boomer had never seen anything like it. It was so big that you could not see from one end to the other; it faded into the horizon. And the Marines who put that together in two weeks didn't stop to rest on their oars; they went through the breach with the combat units and continued to do their thing.

You can talk all you want about the air and ground campaigns, and--God bless them--those warriors did a magnificent job. I'd never begin to take anything from them. Ten years from now, however, when historians and strategists and tacticians study the Gulf War--what they will study most carefully will be the logistics. This was a war of logistics.

Brigadier General Admire commanded the 3d Marines during the Persian Gulf conflict. In this, the second of two articles, General Admire describes training and fighting with Arab allies during Desert Shield, emphasizing the importance of close personal relationships between allies in coalition warfare. "Task Force Taro" is an allusion to an edible plant common in Hawaii, the home port of the 3d Marines.

The 3d Marines in Desert Storm

By Brigadier General John H. Admire

Marine Corps Gazette, September 1991

When the 3d Marines deployed to Saudi Arabia in mid-to-late August 1990, they immediately displaced to base camps and forward defensive positions. A rear area was established at Ra's Al Ghar, which was a Saudi Marine recruit training facility south of Jubail. This created unique opportunities for the Hawaii Marines. This association with fellow Marines provided the 3d Marines with the training areas and ranges needed to conduct weapons firing and field training. Initially, ordnance restrictions and training area constraints delayed field exercises for most American forces. But the bond of cooperation between Saudi and American Marines enabled us to begin a cross-training program that eventually expanded considerably.

MajGen James M. Myatt, commanding general, 1st Marine Division, encouraged and directed the 3d Marines to become the division's focal point for cross-training initiatives with the Arab Coalition forces. (See author's article in *MCG*; Aug91.) Consequently, in October 1990 the regiment, which became known as Task Force Taro, began training with the Saudi Arabian King Abdul Aziz Brigade. The Saudi brigade was located on the Saudi and Kuwaiti border and training with them allowed us to operate on terrain in which we would later conduct combat operations.

From October through December the 3d Marines rotated company (-) reinforced units of 150-200 U.S. Marines forward to train with the Saudis. These 8- to 10-day training periods focused on the complete spectrum of military subjects: tactics, weapons, leadership, and maintenance, among others. We were very conscious and careful, however, to present the cross-training as a mutually supporting and reciprocal effort. We acknowledged the Saudi expertise in desert tactics and asked them to teach desert survival, desert navigation, and desert tracking classes. Throughout the next three months the exchange of tactical knowledge and procedures enhanced the capabilities of both forces. In the process, however, a significantly more vital relationship began developing. Arab and American friendships emerged founded on the common bond of the brotherhood of arms.

A unique camaraderie developed as a natural result of the challenges and sacrifices of desert life. American Marines were invited into Saudi Bedouin tents for meals and began to experience Arab culture and hospitality. Marines hosted Arab Coalition Forces during our traditional Marine Corps Birthday Ceremony and acquainted Arabs with the heritage of our Corps. The friendships grew into a special trust and confidence between Arabs and Americans and became the foundation for future battlefield success.

In January 1991, partially because of the Task Force Taro and the Saudi brigade relationship, the 3d Marines displaced forward to Al Mish'ab. The area had been previously an exclusively Arab sector for combat forces. Nonetheless, because of this special rapport, Task Force Taro became the northernmost forward-deployed Marine combat force in Saudi Arabia.

At this phase in the deployment, the 1st Marine Division and its combat forces were located approximately 80 to 100 kilometers south and to the rear of Task Force Taro. Therefore, we adopted the concept that if the war were to suddenly be initiated by the enemy, Task Force Taro would fight with and alongside Arab Coalition Forces instead of the 1st Marine Division. Consequently, cross-training with the Arab Coalitions Forces expanded and intensified. Positioned in the midst of Saudi Army, Marine, and National Guard Forces, as well as Qatari, Pakistani, Moroccan, Bangladeshi, and later the Afghan "Freedom Fighters" (the *Mujahadin*), Task Force Taro began training daily with coalition units.

The Task Force's primary mission was to plan and prepare for helicopter-borne assaults as the 1st Marine Division's helo assault force. But once committed the regiment's tasks would focus on defeating Iraqi armor/mech counterattack forces. Therefore, as a basic infantry force with mobile anti-armor assets limited to TOWs and heavy machineguns, antitank tactics became critical to Task Force Taro. We had no access to American armor/mech assets; the Arabs had the only antiarmor assets in the area. Task Force Taro provided the helicopters and Arabs provided the tanks for helo assault and infantry-versus-tank classes, respectively. These cooperative training programs further strengthened the bonds of professional and personal friendships and contributed significantly to preparations for the approaching war.

On 17 January 1991 the allied air campaign was initiated. In response, the Iraqi Army conducted supporting arms attacks into Saudi Arabia. As the most forward-deployed U.S. combat unit, Task Force Taro became the first American unit to receive Iraqi artillery, rocket, and missile fire. As a counter to the Iraqi threat, however, Task Force Taro initiated the first ground-oriented attacks against Iraqi positions in Kuwait by conducting an artillery raid on 20-21 January. (See "Artillery in the Desert, 1991: Report #1" MCG, Apr91, for more details on raids of this type.) Arab Coalition Force observers were invited to participate and subsequent American Marine instruction and rehearsals with the Arabs prepared them for the conduct of similar raids. Thereafter, artillery raids and border skirmishes were conducted randomly and frequently.

In retaliation for American and Arab artillery raids, the Iraqi Army attacked Saudi Arabia. The Iraqis conducted two coordinated attacks during 29-31

January. To the west an Iraqi assault was defeated by the 1st Light Armor Infantry (LAI) Battalion. To the east the Iraqis attacked and seized the coastal town of Khafji. The town had been evacuated and abandoned by the Saudis because of its close proximity to the border and the frequent enemy artillery barrages into the city. The sustainment of civilian casualties was unnecessary and Khafji's citizens were temporarily relocated to safety. Tactically, the town was undefended, with a defensive line established to the south of the city. This created a buffer zone between the Iraqis and the Americans and Arabs in which any Iraqi advance could be engaged by supporting arms fire. In essence, Khafji became a trap, and the Iraqis fell for it.

Prior to sunset on the day the Iraqis captured Khafji, we conferred with Arab Coalition Force leaders to develop plans for a counterattack. We advised Col Turki, the Saudi brigade commander, and the Qatari commanders of proposed actions, explaining that two Task Force Taro reconnaissance teams had remained in Khafji to continue their intelligence collection tasks and engage the Iraqis with artillery fire and air strikes. We offered that the Marine recon teams could remain undetected for 36-48 hours, but that thereafter their positions would probably be compromised.

For me, the Battle of Khafji involved one of the most difficult decisions I've ever had to make. As a Marine, as a leader of Marines, one waits a career for such an opportunity to execute a major counterattack, to recapture an enemy-seized objective, to validate months of arduous training and preparations in actual combat. It truly was the opportunity of a lifetime for a Marine. I believed in my Marines, and I was confident in our capabilities. But it was also an opportunity for us as Americans to demonstrate our belief, our trust, our confidence in the Arab Coalition Forces.

Therefore, with MajGen Myatt's concurrence and support, we deferred to the Arab Forces. We encouraged them to be the main attack. We accepted the secondary role as the supporting force. Khafji was in the Arab area of operations, and for us to preempt the Arabs with an American dominated attack would have been, at least in my opinion, counterproductive to the four months of cross-training we had accomplished with the Arab Coalition Forces. Khafji, therefore, was truly an Arab victory. It was a difficult decision to defer to the Arab Forces, but it was the right decision. The Battle of Khafji was a tactical victory for the Arabs; it was a strategic victory for the Americans.

Task Force Taro planning initiatives focused on the Saudi and Qatar forces conducting the main attack with their armor and mech forces. Concurrently, American Marines would support the assault with antiarmor weapons systems and infantry security forces as well as air-naval gunfire liaison teams. But, more important, Task Force Taro would provide the supporting arms fire, primarily artillery, as well as the critical air support.

The plan agreed to, Col Turki ordered the attack. Within hours the Saudis and Qataris, with American Marine support, executed a night probing attack to determine Iraqi Army unit dispositions and reactions within Khafji. Then, after a planned withdrawal and the finalization of the plan, we counterattacked and within 6 to 12 hours routed the Iraqi units in Khafji, recaptured the city, and

safely recovered the American Marine recon teams. In the process, over 600 Iraqi enemy prisoners of war (EPWs) were captured and over 90 Iraqi tanks and armored personnel carriers were destroyed.

The statistics, however, were secondary to the true consequences of the Battle of Khafji. To understand its true meaning, one must appreciate the preceding circumstances and situations. At the time Col Turki courageously announced, "We attack," the Iraqi Army was the fourth largest army in the world. It was reported to be the most combat tested, experienced military in the world as a result of its eight-year war with Iran. Furthermore, in the vicinity of Khafji, intelligence analysts estimated the Iraqis had approximately four to six times the number of tanks we had and six to eight times the artillery pieces.

Meanwhile the Saudi military had minimal experience in conventional battles in modern times, especially ones with the technical and sophisticated weapons on today's modern battlefield. Similarly, the Qataris, to our knowledge, had never deployed from their sovereign borders to participate in combat. It truly was a situation of David versus Goliath. But in the Arab Coalition Forces' slingshot was the support of the American Marines. The mutual trust and confidence among the respective forces ensured a crushing Iraqi defeat and a crucial American and Arab victory. From that point on there was absolutely no question regarding the courage and conviction of the Arab Coalition Forces.


There were other consequences of the Battle of Khafji as well. First, the confidence and morale of the Arab Coalition Forces were enhanced immeasurably. Second, we concluded that the Iraqi Army had no resolve. We advised Gen Myatt that if we hit the Iraqis hard and fast they would quit--and quit early. We surmised that the Iraqis had no desire to stand toe to toe and engage in a slug-fest with a dedicated opponent. Consequently, Gen Myatt decided to pull battalions off the line and to assign them the principal task of EPW collection and control. This would contribute to a rapid and unimpeded attack by Marine forces and free them from anticipated administrative and logistical burdens. Third, the Arab Coalition Forces requested a major modification to the ground campaign scheme of maneuver. It was this third consequence that proved critical to the subsequent assault into Kuwait and Iraq.

Previously, the ground scheme of maneuver called for U.S. Marines to attack north in the eastern and central portion of Kuwait. The U.S. Army and British and French forces would also attack north from positions to the west. Meanwhile, the majority of the Arab Coalition Forces would follow in trace of the attacking Americans and Europeans. The American Marines would then encircle Kuwait City and secure all entrances and exits to the city. At this point the Arab Forces would conduct a passage of lines and clear the city by house-to-house and door-to-door fighting.

But after the Battle of Khafji victory, the Arab command advocated that they attack as equal partners with the American and multinational forces. The Arabs acknowledged that if the Americans were to breach the formidable Iraqi defenses, they too would assault the barriers and attack on line with the Marines. Therefore, this proposal resulted in the Arab Coalition Forces, primarily Saudi and Qatari, attacking north in the eastern avenue of approach centered on the

displacement we received a new mission as an infiltration force to secure the 1st Marine Division's right flank. Previously, the Task Force had trained in virtually every conceivable mission, but the infiltration task was never a focus. Although we had from our other training an appreciation of how the infiltration task might contribute to the main attack forces--Task Force Ripper and Task Force Papa Bear--the new mission was somewhat of a psychological shock to Task Force Taro. We were encouraged by MajGen Myatt's confidence in assigning us such a critical task with minimum notice and accepted our supporting attack role with the understanding that we would have no armor, no assault amphibious vehicles, no major mechanical or explosive breaching assets. We would simply infiltrate at night on foot, with bayonets and rifles as our principal weapons.

The evening of 22 February we crossed the border into Kuwait on foot to attack positions south of the Iraqi defensive barrier. Throughout the daylight hours of 23 February we remained undetected in harbor sites and prepared for the infiltration. Then, the evening of 23 February, crawling on hands and knees, Task Force Taro infiltration forces penetrated the substantial Iraqi minefields, barbed-wire obstacles, tank traps, and earthen berms. By sunrise the lead elements had penetrated the barrier and initiated the clearing and proofing of three vehicle lanes for follow-on forces.



The success of the infiltration mission by Task Force Taro and Task Force Grizzly, on the division's right and left flanks, respectively, had significant impact. We penetrated the Iraqi defenses, surprised the enemy forces, operated behind enemy lines to distract the enemy's attention from the main assault, and secured the flanks from anticipated Iraqi armor/mech counterattacks. The confidence and morale of the main assault forces were enhanced significantly with the knowledge that the attack had been successfully initiated and was proceeding as planned.

Thereafter, the main assault task forces executed the primary breach on the Iraqi first defensive barrier. We had anticipated that the Iraqis would defend relatively lightly at the first barrier, but would defend in strength at the second barrier. Consequently, we deduced that once we had penetrated the first barrier and were consolidating to attack the second barrier, the division's advance would be vulnerable to Iraqi artillery fire and armor/mech counterattacks. The enemy's numerical superiority in armor and artillery assets rendered it imperative that the attack proceed with utmost speed between the two barriers. The rapid and continuous attack was dependent upon Marine close air support to neutralize Iraqi massed armor counterattacks and supporting arms fires.

Unfortunately, the prevailing northeasterly thunderstorm winds and the massive smoke clouds from the approximately 600 oil wells that had been exploded and ignited by the Iraqis reduced ground visibility to about 100 meters and neutralized the crucial Marine air support. As if by divine intervention, however, approximately one hour prior to the required decision time for the execution or delay of the attack on the second barrier, the winds shifted from the south and clouds disappeared and the skies cleared. The attack continued as planned. The second barrier was assaulted and secured.

On 25 February, Task Force Taro conducted the only Marine helicopterborne assault of the war. Assaulting into the flaming inferno of the Burgan oilfields, Task Force Taro elements expanded the security and screen of the division's right flank. Then on 26 February, the task force executed an all-night movement to attack positions south of Kuwait International Airport. At sunrise on 27 February, in trace of the 1st LAI Battalion, Task Force Taro secured the airport and the Marine Corps' final objective of the war. A cease-fire was proclaimed on 28 February and negotiations were initiated for Iraqi compliance with the United Nations resolutions as a prelude to peace.

This article has focused almost entirely on the Hawaii Marines, Task Force Taro. The victory on the Arabian Peninsula was achieved by the contributions of all our Nation's Military Services as well as the Arab and multinational forces. It was a joint and combined effort. We are appreciative of the contributions of all concerned and proud to have played our small part in the ultimate outcome.

Captain Padilla served as a weapons and sensors officer with Marine All Weather Fighter Attack Squadron 121, which flew the F/A-18D Hornet during Desert Storm. In this brief article, Captain Padilla describes his squadron's preparations for war and the techniques used in combat.

F/A-18Ds Go to War

by Captain Rueben A. Padilla, USMC

U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, August 1991

Marine All-Weather Fighter-Attack Squadron 121 began trading in its A-6Es for two-seat night-attack F/A-18Ds on 27 April 1990 at home base in California, and left for Saudi Arabia on 7 January 1991--five days later, six aircraft and 118 Marines were at Shaik Isa air base in Bahrain.

By the end of January the whole squadron was there--12 F/A-18Ds and 204 Marines, including 34 pilots and WSOs (weapons and sensors officers).

A lot happened before we got to the Middle East. The new aircraft arrived at a rate of two per month and we trained constantly. The aircraft has many capabilities and missions, some of which are:

- > Air-to-air
- > Air-to-ground
- > Night attack
- > Combined arms control and coordination
- > Reconnaissance

In July 1990, the squadron was preparing to send a six-plane detachment to Turkey to participate in Exercise Display Determination and was scheduled to send a detachment to Naval Air Station Fallon, Nevada, in early August to prepare for the exercise. On 2 August Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait; two days latter the detachment flew up to Fallon--and on 9 August was recalled to El Toro.

Aircrew training became paramount as small detachments deployed to MCAS Yuma, Arizona, to take advantage of the desert terrain. Crews began intensive night operations, with lunar illumination cycles determining deployment schedules. The squadron trained 18 pilots and WSOs to employ the nightattack Hornet's weapons systems, and the crews concentrated on deep air support missions, flying low-level routes, and attacking targets throughout the desert.

Target tactics varied from low-level weapons deliveries to the Hornet high-popup maneuver--a low-level run-in, an afterburner climb to roll-in altitude, and a 45 degrees dive attack. All of these missions were conducted using Catseye night-vision goggles, and--when they were available--forward-looking

infrared systems (FLIR) for navigation. In the Middle East, both navigation and targeting FLIRs were available.

The squadron became fully operational in September 1990 and conducted two full squadron deployments during October and November to Yuma and Nellis Air Force Base, Nevada.

When the call came to deploy to the Middle East, we were assigned a primary mission of combined arms control and coordination--specifically, the squadron flew tactical air coordinator (airborne) [TACA] and forward air controller (airborne [FAC(A)] missions. This included spotting for artillery and naval gunfire. The services sometimes use slightly different terms to describe similar functions, but the squadron's mission is best described as that of a fast FAC, as distinct from the turboprop-powered OV-10DS.

High speed was our best defense against infrared (IR) surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) while high-speed antiradiation missiles (HARM) carried by escort Hornets suppressed radar-guided SAMs. In addition, EA-6Bs provided standoff jamming support for all aircraft in the Kuwait theater of operations.

Our squadron was largely involved in preparing the battlefield and supporting ground units in the battle to retake Kuwait. The U.S. Central Command established kill zones in which we operated. These zones, squares of terrain about 15 miles on a side, were used as limits for aircraft operating within them. Each zone had an alpha-numeric designation but these rapidly gave way to geographical references--the golf course, the Pentagon, the ice cube tray, and arty (artillery) road--as the aircrews became familiar with the area.

Armed with kill-zone charts, 2.75-inch rockets and white phosphorous warheads, and 20-mm. ammunition, we flew our first mission into southern Kuwait on 18 January.

Aircrews launched and proceeded directly to a Marine Corps KC-130 tanker to top off with fuel before heading into their assigned area. Prebriefed targets were reconnoitered to determine which were active, and then the F/A-18Ds marked the targets for the strike aircraft. Priorities--in order--were: artillery and rocket launchers, armor, troops, and trench lines. FAC aircraft remained on station for about 30 minutes, working as many as 21 strike aircraft during that time.

After the first period, FACs cycled back to the tanker and then returned to their assigned area for another 30 minutes before heading home. Typical target areas were more than 200 miles from Bahrain.

We used high-altitude tactics during the early part of the war identifying targets through 7- and 10-power binoculars. Secondary explosions after initial strike aircraft runs often confirmed active Iraqi positions.

Aircrews flew around the clock, using night-vision goggles when required. On the night of 29 January, when Iraqi forces moved south toward Khafji and other Coalition positions, fast FACs used goggles to provide accurate marks for a section of A-6Es to lay a string of Rockeye antiarmor submunitions across a column of advancing Iraqi armor, and stop it dead in its tracks. Marines on the ground then captured the Iraqi forces.

During the 100-hour ground campaign, the fast FACs roamed ahead of advancing Coalition forces and continued to mark targets for a wide variety of strike aircraft. What had once been no-man's land--Al Wafra, Al Jabar, arty road--quickly turned into friendly territory. It was a combined arms effort.

The artillery raid has received little attention in recent years, rating only the most cursory mention in schools and manuals. Yet, during Desert Storm, the artillery raid proved to be one of the artillery's most important missions, and almost the only form of ground combat between 16 January and 24 February. In this article Lieutenant Colonel Sachtleben describes how the 5th Battalion, 11th Marines, which he commanded, prepared for and executed artillery raids.

Artillery Raids in Southwestern Kuwait

by Lieutenant Colonel James L. Sachtleben, USMC

Field Artillery, October 1991

During early January 1991, the commanding general of I Marine Expeditionary Force (I MEF) decided that ground forces would be involved in pre-G-Day operations to deceive and disrupt Iraqi forces operating in the defensive belts along the southwestern Saudi-Kuwaiti border. As the 1st Marine Division analyzed its portion of this mission, the artillery raid seemed tailor-made for the situation. It allowed for surprise, maximum destruction of enemy equipment and a certain psychological impact on the Iraqi troops. If conducted from Saudi Arabia, we could accomplish all this without the political ramifications of having ground forces conduct cross-border operations before G-Day.

Forces

As the 1st Division Commander discussed the mission with the commanding officer of the 11th Marines (the division's artillery regiment), it became apparent that the logical unit for the raid mission was the 5th Battalion, 11th Marines (5/11), the division's general support (GS) battalion.

This was true for two reasons. First, as the GS battalion, 5/11 had more positioning flexibility than the direct support (DS) battalions that had to remain in a position to provide fires for their supported maneuver task forces. Secondly, 5/11 had an M109 battery. At this point, because we still respected the Iraqi counterfire capability, it seemed wise to employ the M109 battery because of its overhead protection, on-board ammunition storage and rapid displacement capability.

The battalion had completed the transition from self propelled (SP) to towed in June 1990. However, the conversion of the battalion's associated prepositioned equipment aboard the maritime prepositioning ships (MPS) squadrons wasn't complete. Therefore, 5/11 had two batteries of M198s (155-mm, towed howitzers) one battery of M109A3s (155-mm, SP) and one battery of M110A1s (203-mm) in SWA.

The division commander asked me to analyze the mission in detail and determine what external assets we'd need. Rather than trust a "paper analysis," we ran through some practice missions to determine what our needs would be.

Security for the raid force became the most obvious. Fortunately, Task Force (TF) Shepherd, composed of elements of the 1st and 3d Light Armored Infantry (LAI) Battalions was already screening in our proposed operating area. TF Shepherd provided a company for security and a very close relationship developed. The commanding officer of Company B of TF Shepherd was integrated into the planning effort early-on and provided invaluable assistance both during planning and execution of the raids. This close association was to prove valuable later on as 5/11 supported TF Shepherd during a pre-G-Day Iraqi spoiling attack and, again, during the attack into Kuwait.

We also needed help moving our SP howitzers over the long distances from the battalion's position area to the final raid assembly area. Reliable navigational aids were a must. We'd be operating well outside the position, location and reporting system's (PLRS') range, and accurate information was critical.

We asked for an electronic warfare surveillance capability to pick up any enemy radio traffic that might indicate the Iraqis had detected our movement or were about to fire on us. On-call, fixedwing air support also seemed to be a good idea in case we ran into trouble. The 1st Marine Division G2 offered remotely piloted vehicle (RPV) support to both locate raid targets and to confirm their final positions as late as possible before firing.

It was apparent that these raids would truly be a combined-arms effort. The final task organization for the raid force is depicted in Figure 1.

Raid Force Task Organization of 5/11

Raid Force

Two Batteries 5/11*

Company B, TF Shepherd (LAI)

Detachment, 3d Assault Amphibian Battalion

Detachment, Motor Transport Battalion, 1st FSSG (HETs)

Detachment, Communications Company, 1st Marine Division (GPS and SATCOM)

Detachment, 1st Radio Battalion, 1st Surveillance, Reconnaissance and Intelligence Group (Mobile Electronic Warfare Surveillance)

Supporting Forces

On-Call Fixed Wing Air Support (Close Air and Electronic Warfare Support)

On-Call MEDEVAC Helicopters

*Assignments rotated between the four firing batteries of the battalion.

Figure 1

Training

After receiving a warning order from the 11th Marines Commander, Sierra Battery began training for the raid mission. Because we had yet to receive a specific target for the first raid, the battery only had my commander's intent: be prepared to move under an LAI screen during hours of darkness to a point within one or two kilometers of the Kuwaiti border, fire approximately 15 rounds per howitzer at a high-value target and withdraw when rounds are complete. Some restrictions applied: no lights would be used—no vehicle blackout lights, flashlights or collimator lights; VHF radio silence was imposed; no advance party would be used; no soft-skinned vehicles would go forward of the final assembly area; and speed was essential.

Battery S honed skills to perfection, and soon it was occupying in complete darkness in less than half the Marine Corps combat readiness evaluation (MCCRE) time standard for daylight occupation. In addition, the battery employed several innovative techniques.

Positioning

Because we wanted no soft-skinned vehicles, we looked for a substitute for the high-mobility multipurpose wheeled vehicle (HMMWV)-mounted position and azimuth determining system (PADS). We chose the hand-held Rockwell global positioning system (GPS), an expensive but totally reliable system. We drew it and an operator from 1st Division's communications company. Normally used to survey PLRS master stations, it provided 10-meter accuracy and tracked up to 16 navigational satellites. It never failed to provide positioning data.

A reliable navigational aid was critical in helping the raid force move into position in the darkness. Just imagine the challenge of navigating across as much as 25 miles of trackless desert on a moonless night with your ultimate destination within one or two kilometers of enemy territory. The reliability of the Rockwell GPS was worth the price. We could have used cheaper, more readily available GPS models, but they occasionally suffered outages due to bad satellite "health" or signals interference. We simply couldn't take the chance.

Directional Control

With its 10-meter accuracy, the Rockwell GPS was good enough for establishing battery location but not good enough for establishing an accurate known direction for laying the battery. So the battery trained for two methods of lay. The first option, if stars were visible, was celestial. If there were no visible stars, the battery laid magnetically.

Celestial skills were honed to perfection. A computer program was used to determine azimuths to easily identifiable stars. In a few days, the battery was establishing directional control in less than one minute, and accuracy, when compared to PADS, checked within one mil. The battery used the magnetic

method of lay as a backup to celestial when stars were obscured by clouds or oil smoke. We established a declination station using PADS at the final assembly area to ensure that aiming circles were as accurate as possible.

Because speed was essential, howitzers were positioned in very close proximity to each other, expediting the laying process. This also simplified control and provided a good, tight position, making it easier for the LAI company to provide security.

Security

Company B of TF Shepherd provided a screen from the final assembly area to the firing point and cover while the battery was in position. The night vision and superb weapons capabilities of the light armored vehicle (LAV) were invaluable. They spotted enemy movement and provided covering fires as the battery withdrew after its first raid. Additional security was provided by the .50 caliber and MK19 machineguns mounted on the M109s.

Providing another layer of security and adding to the combined-arms nature of the raids was fixed-wing aviation from the 3d Marine Aircraft Wing. Under control of Company B's forward air controller (FAC), EA-6B Prowlers jammed Iraqi ground surveillance radars as soon as the raid force entered a radar capabilities fan and continued jamming until the raid was completed. F/A-18, AV-8B and A-6E strike aircraft were on call to provide support if the raid force ran into trouble and to attack certain targets in coordination with the artillery when it was appropriate. The F/A-18s were exceptionally valuable in a later raid as we refined concepts and devised more innovative methods.

Meteorological Support

We needed accurate meteorological data if our fires were to be effective. It would have been very simple to "fly a Met" balloon in the position area near Al Qaraah before the raid force departed, but the accuracy would have been poor for two reasons. Some of the raids were conducted as far as 70 kilometers from Al Qaraah, and the raid force often departed as early as eight hours before the scheduled firing times. The separation in both time and distance would have rendered the Met useless.

The solution was for the raid force to take the meteorological data system (MDS) as far as the final assembly area, usually 10 to 15 kilometers from the planned firing point. In the assembly area, MDS set up and ran a Met, and delivered the data to the battery fire direction centers (FDCs) before they departed for the firing points.

The only problem we encountered with Met was one instance when the MDS tracking frequency was jammed as a Met balloon was being flown, causing us to lose the top three lines of Met data. We confirmed the jamming was coming from the Iraqis and devised procedures to work through the jamming should it happen again. We weren't jammed again on a raid, but interference with Met frequencies was a common occurrence in several Marine Corps artillery units.

Communications

The raid force used only limited communications. Checkpoints were reported and emergency messages, such as mission abort codes, were the only traffic passed. Because of the very long distance involved, the raid force commander's only link to higher headquarters was via satellite communications (SATCOM) to the division forward command post (CP), initially some 75 miles away. SATCOM was used to report the occurrence of key events on the execution checklist (see Figure 2) and to confirm target location just before the force departed the final assembly area.

Sample Artillery Raid Execution Checklist of 5/11

Codeword	Event
Apple	Raid Force arrives in Assembly Area
Orange	Raid Force at Firing Position
Peach	Target Confirmed
Cherry	Commencing Attack
Grape	Withdrawing Raid Force
Banana	Mission Complete; Returning to Battalion Position Area
Chicken Hawk	Mission Abort

Figure 2

Command and Control

When we added a second firing battery to the raid force, we also added a command element to control the activities of the two-battery force. The command element had to be very small and light. It consisted of the battalion commander or executive officer as the raid force commander, a driver, the battalion sergeant major (doubling as radio operator and navigator) and the SATCOM radio operator. The command element led the raid force to the final assembly area and reported, as necessary, to the division forward CP via SATCOM.

All raids were well-rehearsed and timeliness were established, based on detailed time and distance studies. Radio transmissions from the command element to the raid force were seldom needed. All required actions were executed on the established timeline, and radios were used only by exception. This detailed planning proved to be the key to success.

Logistics

The raid force carried only essential items, including only enough artillery ammunition for one mission. Medical evacuation (MEDEVAC) helicopters were on strip alert. Two assault amphibian vehicles (AAVS) were part of the raid force; one carried the FDC, and one was a MEDEVAC vehicle.

To reduce the chance of breakdown, the raid force used heavy equipment transporters (HETs) to move the tracked vehicles from the initial battalion position in the vicinity of Al Qaraah to the final assembly area. The 1st Force Service Support Group (1st FSSG) provided the HETs, and although their operators weren't specifically trained for such a tactical mission, they performed very well.

Special care had to be taken, however, because some of the tractors were commercial vehicles provided by the Saudis. They had no blackout systems, so the raid force had to disconnect electrical wires to prevent the inadvertent illumination of a brake light or the honking of a horn at a time when the enemy could detect it.

On 18 January, 5/11 moved from its position 30 kilometers south of Safaniya, Saudi Arabia, to the vicinity of Al Qaraah (see Figure 3). Al Qaraah was to later become quite a busy place, occupied by most of 1st Division and a sizeable combat service support detachment. However, when 5/11 first arrived, there were only empty revetments built by Seabees in anticipation of the coming "population explosion." We were very glad to see the revetments because of the security they provided. At the time, there were no other units in the vicinity except TF Shepherd, which was screening to the north. The remainder of the division was still at least 75 miles to the southeast.

We settled into the revetments, made liaison with TF Shepherd and waited for our first mission. It came on 23 January.

The Raids

Raid 1: The Police Post at Qalamat

The target was an Iraqi infantry brigade CP near Al Manaqish. To range the targets, the battery had to be near the border, in this case, very close to the Kuwaiti border police post at Qalamat, which was occupied by Iraqi troops. Because of the possible threat from the police post, Battery Q (MI98) was added to the raid force to fire on enemy positions closest to Battery S.

After midnight, both batteries moved out under LAI screen for their firing points. Battery Q stopped, laid the howitzers and waited for Battery S to occupy its position near the berm that marked the border. Battery S started firing as soon as possible after arriving in position. The first rounds went down range at 0053, just seconds off the time estimated in the plan. Battery Q fired as soon as it saw Battery S's muzzle flashes. A 5/11 forward observer posted on top of the berm spotted enemy activity at another location and quickly shifted Battery Q's fires.




Figure 3: Batteries of 5/11 participated in four artillery raids to help deceive Iraqis as to the location of IMEF's intended attack into Kuwait. The very successful raids also demoralized the Iraqi forces in the defensive belts along the Kuwaiti border.

A very unlucky group of Iraqis had just driven into the target area when Battery Q's rounds impacted on the second target. The dual-purpose improved conventional munitions (DPICM) destroyed three vehicles and caused two others to disperse very rapidly. One hapless Iraqi drove across the border into Saudi Arabia and into Company B's machinegun fire. We couldn't believe the success we were having but decided to cut it short when mortar rounds started falling on the friendly side of the berm near Battery S. We shifted Battery Q's fires to a third target, a suspected D-30 battery, and as S Battery withdrew, the FAC with B Company called in a pair of F/A-18s with Rockeye bombs on the brigade CP and the police post just for added security.

We had agreed early-on that enemy incoming would be cause to abort the mission, at the battery commander's discretion. The assets were too valuable and the ground war hadn't even started yet; we could raid again another day.

Raid 2: Police Post at Umm Hujul

This was really not an artillery raid but an LAI raid with artillery in direct support, or as it came to be known, the "drive-by shooting." The same division fragmentary order that established the 5/11 as the raid force also tasked 5/11 to be prepared to support TF Shepherd in any raids it might execute. The raid on the police post at Umm Hujul was such a raid.

Considerable Iraqi activity had been noted near the police post, and the raid was intended to disrupt enemy activity, spoil his intelligence-gathering efforts and discourage any further buildup in the area. The concept was very simple. TF Shepherd slipped up to the border and fired on the police post with mortar and 25-mm cannons while 5/11 isolated the objective area by firing on an enemy position behind a low ridgeline just to the east of the post. The police post and adjacent positions were heavily damaged, and the raid force received no return fire from the Iraqis.

Raid 3: SIGINT Near Umm Gudair

Iraqi signals intelligence (SIGINT) and ground surveillance radars in the vicinity of the Umm Gudair oil field were the target of this raid. Battery T, the M110A2 battery, and Battery Q, an M198 battery, had the mission. We needed DPICM for these targets, but one was outside the range of the M109 and M198. The 22,500-meter range of 8-inch DPICM, as compared to the 17,500 meters of the M109 and M198, proved invaluable here as well as later in the ground campaign.

I was a little concerned about the M110A2 as a raiding piece. Its slower rate of fire and longer emplacement times meant the battery would be in position longer and, thus, at a greater risk from counterfire. However, the larger payload of the 8-inch as compared to the 155-mm DPICM meant the battery could fire fewer rounds and achieve equal or greater effects. Also, by this time, we started to question the Iraqi counterfire capability.

We had taken mortar rounds on the first raid, but there was no evidence the Iraqis could find us with anything other than forward observers in frontline infantry units who could spot our muzzle flashes. We trusted the EA-6Bs to handle the Iraqi ground surveillance and counterbattery radars, and they obviously did. But why were the Iraqis so ineffective with the sound-ranging systems that were supposed to be so good? We weren't sure, but our confidence was growing. We decided to fight the urge to stay and shoot all night and continued to "shoot and scoot." The real ground war was still days away, and we couldn't afford to risk assets needed later.

Raid 4: Iraqi Batteries

This one appeared to be the most effective-it was a true combined-arms effort. The targets were two Iraqi artillery batteries. Two M198 batteries (Q and R) conducted the raid, again moving into position under an LAI screen. The idea was to stay in position longer than on previous raids, fire more rounds and see if we could draw some Iraqi counterfire for the F/A-18s to attack. We did no electronic jamming with the EA6Bs. This time we wanted the Iraqi ground surveillance and counterbattery radars to find us.

It was a calculated risk, but we had analyzed the enemy artillery in the area and were pretty sure he couldn't range us with his systems. We were firing rocket assisted projectiles (RAP), giving us greater standoff distance and reducing his chances of ranging us.

The plan worked *beautifully*. Shortly after our rounds impacted, we saw his artillery lighting up in counterfire. It appeared to be rockets, and we assumed it to be Astros multiple rocket launchers (MRLs). The airborne FAC spotted the flashes immediately, and within seconds, the Iraqi racketeers were visited by a pair of screaming F/A-18s delivering Rockeye. Because of the flat terrain, we could see the Rockeye impacts from our battery positions. It was heartwarming, especially knowing that the targets the Rocketeyes were hitting had been trying to put rockets on us.

After 10 February, we stood down from the raid mission and rejoined the rest of the 1st Division, moving into Al Qaraah and making final preparations for the attack into Kuwait. The raids had been very demanding on both personnel and equipment, and we needed at least a short rest.

Results of the Raids

The goals of the raids were to deceive the enemy as to the location of the coming attack and destroy the morale of the Iraqi forces in the defensive belts along the border. In the context of the very successful attack into Kuwait, the raids accomplished their goals. Although the raids were a small part of the overall deception plan, they can't be gauged by the amount of damage they inflicted on the enemy. The raid force appeared in the middle of the night and fired from positions the enemy had every right to believe were unoccupied. This had to shake his confidence in his intelligence capabilities.

Target surveillance by RPVs and other assets showed the raid fires, with rare exception, to be very accurate. While the Iraqi target acquisition capability grew more suspect, their frontline troops were being subjected to fires that were accurate to a degree they couldn't comprehend.

The coordinated counterfire effort between artillery and aviation displayed in the fourth raid undoubtedly had a demoralizing effect on Iraqi artillerymen.

Was it partially responsible for the complete inability of the Iraqis to mount a counterfire threat or to mass fires later during the attack into Kuwait? This question can only generate speculation, of course, but put yourself in the place of the Iraqi rocketeers: they fired a counterbattery volley in response to our artillery fires, and within seconds of their first and only volley, they were hit by very effective aviation ordnance. Their morale *undoubtedly* suffered.

It'll remain difficult to quantitatively measure the effects of these artillery raids. But there's no doubt that during Operation Desert Storm the previously insignificant artillery raid became a very significant combat multiplier.

Major Huddleston was the Executive Officer, 3d Battalion, 3d Marines during Desert Storm. In this letter, he recounts his impressions of the first few days of the war.

The Opening of DESERT STORM: From the Frontlines

by Major Craig Huddleston

Marine Corps Gazette, April 1991

Welcome to Operation DESERT STORM. Not much time for a long letter, but I'll give you some thoughts. There is such a thing as "fog of war." We've already been up and down our alert ladder many times. "They're attacking," "They're not," "We're attacking," "We're not" "Gas, Gas, Gas!" "All clear." Lots of information coming in, most of it false.

The start of the operation caught us by total surprise. We were told 25 January or sometime around then would be the kickoff. Here is the sequence of events from my point of view during the opening hours of DESERT STORM:

- 2210 (17Jan): I had just lain down to go to sleep. News reports say air is winning war.
- 2215: WHAM--WHAM, WHAM, WHAM! Time to go to work.
- 2217: Arrive at COC (combat operations center). STA (surveillance and target acquisition platoon), observation post Dragons, and 81s all report incoming. Several air bursts, no casualties. Regiment wants to know what's up.
- 2230: TOW section reports 20 to 25 vehicles in column moving south on main supply route. "What type?" "BTR-60s." Expletive.
- 2245: Regiment orders stand-to to repel ground and sea attacks. A-10s on station, attacking. Heavy AAA (antiaircraft artillery), ZSU, and SA-6 fire observed.
- 2330: Vehicles identified as Saudi.
- 0220: (18Jan): Stand-down.
- 0250: WHAM, WHAM-BOOM. More rockets. Company F, 1st Battalion, 12th Marines reports airburst over battery position. "Gas, Gas, Gas!" Expletive. Several people observe Scud-Patriot intercept.
- 0300: Monitors out.
- 0340: Reports state no agents detected.
- 0600: Sun comes up. Hot chow. Sent out crater analysis.
- 1545: Air alert. Scuds launched.
- 1600: All clear.

- 1640: Report of 8 to 10 vehicles moving south--3 tanks. Stand-to ordered.
- 1710: "All clear." Vehicles identified as friendly.
- 1830: Marine leaving head yells, "Incoming, take cover!" Look up to see multiple rocket trails. Expletive. We get down. Thirty impact well west of us. OV-10 and recon observe launch, roll A-6s in, but nothing there.
- 2100: Try to sleep, but we go on air or Scud alert five times during night.
- 0800 (19Jan): Ordered to rehearse TRAP (tactical recovery of aircraft, equipment, personnel). No hot chow, but mail arrives in morning.
- 0900: Write this letter. Think about changing skivvies.

The press is giving accurate, if somewhat inflated, info. They've got about 10 percent of this story.

The air guys are doing a great job. The Iraqis have not quit, however. At least at the tactical level. They fight back with what they've got.

Constant OV-10s, remotely piloted vehicles, and other air overhead. Noise of bomb impacts 24 hours a day.

Capt Murray W. Chapman got first blood for us, assisting on a close air support mission against Iraqi medium rocket launchers (MRLs). OV-10 controlled, four A-10s attacked to silence the MRLs, temporarily. (A-10s were on station five minutes after we called for them.)

We're all very tired. Trying to get sleep is hard with various alerts (air, Scud, artillery, terrorist ground attack) being given every two hours or so.

Troops, are handling all this quite well. We've been pretty scared sometimes, but we're responding well.

Before the war, it was neat being the northernmost U.S. unit (excepting recon and other intelligence units, etc.). How we'd be glad for a rear area security mission.

A 300mm rocket makes a crater 12 feet in diameter and 3 feet deep. They have a spectacular signature at night, both during launch and impact. The launcher can displace in seconds after launch. We've had trouble killing them, but they're not too accurate.

We need a good E-tool. The shovel has been our best friend so far.

Biggest problem has been identification, friend or foe, on the ground. Too many vehicles look like the ones Iraq uses, especially at night. We've had some very anxious moments when things start moving.

No apparent concern in Qatar or Saudi armies about Israeli reaction to Scud attacks. We've all taken fire from Iraqi artillery and rockets and know who the enemy is. Closest Qatar unit really mad; they lost field mess to first rocket attack!

Gotta go. Very busy times. We're all okay so far. I'll send more when I get a chance. Semper Fi.

Earlier in this anthology, Molly Moore described the war from the perspective of the commanding general's headquarters. In these articles, Moore takes us to the opposite extreme, showing what the war was like for the individual Marine.

Out Front at the Front: Marines Brace for Task of Clearing Mines

By Molly Moore

The Washington Post, 19 February 1991

WITH U.S. FORCES, Northern Saudi Arabia, Feb. 18--One night soon, Marine Lance Cpl. Stephen Mitchell, 20, expects to drive a 26-ton mine-breaching personnel carrier across the Kuwaiti border and into a sandy sea of buried mines.

"I'll be one of the first ones across the line," said the lanky Washington, D.C., native, unconsciously fingering, the two metal crosses that hang from a silver chain around his neck--one sent by his mother, the other by his aunt. "Sometimes I sit and wonder, and try to picture in my mind what it will be like."

All too frequently the picture is horrifying.

"In training, there is always one little thing that will go wrong," he said with a shudder. "It gets you down. Will it happen in combat? It's real hard, real hard."

When the traveling chaplain, or Mitchell's buddies who sleep with him inside the hulking metal vehicle dubbed "The Big Red One," can't console him, Mitchell relieves the pressures on his mind by "going to the paper and pen and writing it down."

Often he mails his deepest thoughts to his girlfriend. He has pasted her picture inside the personnel carrier that will push his team of mine breachers ahead to clear the way for the American tanks and infantry units that will battle Iraqi forces.

For many of the thousands of American troops now moving into their final positions across the northern Saudi Arabian desert, within sight of the nightly allied bombing raids against Iraqi forces, the easiest mental escape from the formidable task that lies before them is simply avoiding the issue.

"Most people don't talk about what happens when we go in," said Navy medical technician Douglas Smith, 35, of Baltimore, a reservist on the crew of a mine-plowing tank who will serve as a medic if his crewmates are injured.

"They speculate about when we will go home. They don't talk about that gray area in between."

Instead, they lose themselves in long card games. They gaze across the flat Saudi desert now covered with the green fuzz of sparse winter grass, and fantasize about showers they haven't had for more than a month and hot meals they left behind weeks ago.

They wiggle into sleeping bags on the cramped floors of personnel carriers and in tiny tank turrets, and dream of soft mattresses and wives and girlfriends half a globe away.

But mostly they work, struggling to keep aging equipment operating in the gritty sand of the desert, miles from the nearest stocks of spare parts and supplies.

"We are constantly, constantly repairing the tank," said Sgt. Nelson Carter, 25, a reservist from Knoxville, Tenn., the senior non-commissioned officer for one team of 11 specially designed tanks.

Both the men and the machines of these mine-breaching teams have been patched together from different bases across the United States for a one-time mission: to slice through the minefields that lie between allied troops and the deeply entrenched Iraqi forces across the border.

They have stuffed amphibious personnel carriers designed for beach assaults with the explosives needed to blast mines from the sand, and they have tacked toothy plows and bulldozer blades to the front of M-60 tanks.

"The manpower came from wherever they could grab them," said Smith, whose original team included a cook, a welder, two heavy-equipment operators and a group of Marines usually assigned to rounding up drunken sailors on shore leave and returning them to their ships.

But in two months, they have trained and equipped potent mine-breaching teams armed with linecharges that will be fired to detonate mines and create lanes through them.

Smith, a medical technician in a Baltimore hospital before he was summoned to active duty late last year, has dubbed his M-80 minescooper "Genesis"--as in "the beginning. the first one through." Genesis has become home to a tight-knit crew of four.

The team members have begun hoarding food--military issue as well as cans of fruit juice, loaves of bread, cookies, sugar and canned meats. It is enough food, according to the crew, to feed the four for a month if supply lines are cut.

What they don't need to eat they plan to use for barter. Because their unit has been culled from several others and finds itself at the bottom of most equipment-requisition lists, its members have refined their trading skills. They swapped an ice cooler for the wrenches needed to fix the tank, and they gave one of their tool boxes in return for batteries.

"We've had to fight for everything," Smith said. "We almost stole the tanks off the ships in order to get them."

It is the camaraderie forged among these fighting men that helps drive them during the long hours of waiting through cold, damp nights and hot, windy days.

"If we can't do our job, no one else can," said Mitchell, referring to the tanks and infantry that will follow his unit into battle.

Many of the Marines have turned to religion, superstition and good luck charms to give them the mental boost to face those jobs.

Cpl. Robert Stacy, 23, of New York City, has clipped two large safety pins in a crude cross on the front of his desert-tan Marine hat: "it is a sign of the cross--or I can use it to fix my clothes when things start getting ripped up."

The crew of an amphibious personnel carrier dubbed "Blaze of Glory" has strung a plastic Bart Simpson doll on a string between two rear antenna. A tape of "Bart Sings the Blues" blares from inside.

For Mitchell, who joined the Marine Corps almost two years ago to escape his Northwest D.C. neighborhood and travel the world, his greatest fantasy now is returning to his hometown for a bar-hopping spree through Georgetown and a welcome-home parade down Pennsylvania Avenue.

He rubbed the cross his mom mailed him--a nickel with a cross cut into its center. "With this, I can't go wrong."

1st Day of War: 'As Scary as You Can Get'

by Molly Moore

The Washington Post, 17 February 1991

WITH U.S. FORCES near Kuwait City: For a Marine grunt fresh out of boot camp and infantry training, clearing Iraqi trenches with nothing more than an M-16 rifle and hand grenades on the first day of war "was scary as you could get."

The first time Iraqi artillery rounds rained on his infantry unit, 20-year-old Pfc. Martin Santos hugged the ground. And when the skirmish was over, he was the first member of his team back inside the tracked armored personnel carrier.

"We just sat there, holding our weapons saying, 'I'm alive, you're alive-are you okay?'" recalled the Palm Beach, Fla., native, who arrived in Saudi Arabia two days before the air war started Jan. 17 and just days after he had finished basic infantry training.

By the second day of war, however, Santos was recognizing the same fear in the faces of hundreds of Iraqi prisoners he was tasked with policing.

"The first ones I saw were afraid," add Santos. "They had pictures of their kids. You would see a tear coming out of their eyes. They'd make motions like they were washing their hands of war and say, 'I'm done.'"

As Staff Sgt Julien Pierre, 37, leaped out of his armored vehicle with team members and began raking Iraqi trenches with gunfire, frightened Iraqis quickly began surrendering. "It was really a confidence boost," he said.

Other Iraqis put up more resistance.

"Not everybody was giving up--some needed encouragement," said Capt. Ray Griggs, commander of the 6th Regiment Charlie company, adding that many Iraqi infantry troops "got shredded by shrapnel."

When the infantry troops spotted one Iraqi soldier who was holding a radio handset to his ear as he called in artillery raids against advancing Americans, they quickly shot him.

On the second day of combat, the company looked across the horizon to see a platoon of Iraqi soldiers marching toward them in step, carrying a mammoth white flag "We just pointed them south," said Griggs.

If It Didn't Have A White Flag, We Shot It

by Molly Moore

The Washington Post, 17 March 1991

JUBAIL, Saudi Arabia: Lt. William Delaney's first view of war turned his stomach. He pulled up to the first Iraqi minefield inside Kuwait at dawn three Sundays ago just in time to see tanks behind his platoon firing on American military trucks to his left. He watched in horror and anger as the vehicles exploded and burned.

"That almost made me physically sick," said the 26-year-old tank platoon leader from Bethesda. "Here we were just starting out, and we were already killing our own troops. Friendly vehicles were hit and burning, and that was the start of the whole thing."

Although Delaney would later learn no one died in the incident, it verified his deepest fear as he led the first allied tanks into Kuwait: "I was prepared to lose some guys very special to me."

As the tanks spearheading Marine Task Force Ripper rumbled forward, Delaney's men spotted the first Iraqi tanks.

"They knew we were coming. We didn't wait to get closer. We destroyed them--in all, our company got 15 tanks. It was unbelievable. Tanks blew up with tremendous explosions. Turrets flipped off. There would be 15 to 20 more explosions as ammo cooked off. Everybody in my platoon got a tank kill. There were dead bodies all over the place."

As the first day of war progressed, "We just destroyed everything in front of us," said Delaney. "If it didn't have a white flag, we shot it--trucks, vehicles, bunkers."

"Marines were trying to kill each other to get to these guys. . . . Then the ground opened up and those guys came out of bunkers--dancing, skipping, singing with their thumbs up. All some had was white toilet paper to surrender. Everytime you saw a POW you were relieved. It was one less guy we would kill or would kill us."

At the end of the first day of combat, troops who had tried to restrain their jubilation on the radio all day collected around their tanks and "traded our feeble war stories," according to Delaney.

As dawn of the second day broke, "Morale was high," Delaney said. "We thought the first day we went through the [Iraqi front lines]. Now we were getting to the good stuff."

Instead, said Delaney, "It was like a road march. . . . One lonely BMP [armored personnel carrier] opened up on our rear. One guy [Marine] opened up with a machine gun." American armored personnel carriers "came from every direction. We were climbing all over ourselves to get a shot at this one guy.

"We were very afraid of getting friendly fire. A tank exploded on the left--somebody had shot from behind." Delaney said he barked into the radio, "Sir, tell them we've got friendlies up here!"

On the dawn of the third day, the tank crews awoke at their encampment to see Kuwait City just ahead. "It felt like the test hadn't started. We expected it to be hard. On a combat scale of 1 to 10, it was a 1."

The Marines also found themselves surrounded by hundreds of deserted Iraqi bunkers and fortifications.

"We went in the bunkers. They had taken everything--cheap stereos, aerobic exercise books. And ominous things like women's underwear--it made you wonder what was the story behind it."

For Delaney, he had accomplished the mission he had anguished over in dozens of heartfelt letters to his father over the previous months: "If I'd lost any of my men, I'd really be hurt. I'd taken these men around the world. They were my responsibility."

The Kurds are a distinct ethnic minority living in the mountains of Northern Iraq, Northwestern Iran and Southern Turkey. For years, the Iraqi government has subjected these people to a deliberate policy of oppression and genocide. Colonel Jones commanded the 24th Marine Expeditionary Unit (Special Operations Capable), the principal Marine component of the allied effort to provide humanitarian relief to the Kurds in the wake of Desert Storm.

Operation PROVIDE COMFORT: Humanitarian and Security Assistance in Northern Iraq

by Colonel James L. Jones

Marine Corps Gazette, November 1991

Hoping to take advantage of the allies victory over Iraq in DESERT STORM, dissident factions within Iraq seized on the moment to launch a courageous, but unsuccessful attempt to topple Saddam Hussein from power this past March. In the aftermath of his army's defeat, Saddam Hussein unleashed the still-capable remnants of his battered force against the Kurdish population of northern Iraq, triggering a desperate human exodus towards sanctuaries in the bordering nations of Turkey, Iran, and to a lesser extent, Syria.

As the media of the world focused on the developing human tragedy of the Kurdish people fleeing by the hundreds of thousands before a vengeful Iraqi Army, worldwide outrage galvanized allied coalition support. From the moment the decision was made to air drop supplies to the fleeing refugees on 7 April, it was clear that there was yet another chapter to be written about DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM. It would become known as PROVIDE COMFORT.

As the situation unfolded during March and early April, the Kurds' flight ended in the mountains of southern Turkey, where an estimated 500,000 refugees were massed, having been pushed over the border and herded into so-called "sanctuaries" by Turkish forces. To the east and south, an estimated 1.3 million Kurdish refugees huddled in similar camps along the Iranian border. The fate of this group has yet to be determined.


It was during the last few days of March that BGen Richard Potter, USA, was ordered to insert his 10th Special Forces Group into the refugee camps. At this time there were 12 such camps with an average population of approximately 45,000. Conservative estimates had approximately 600 people dying of exposure, malnutrition, and disease daily. In this area of the world, March is still a winter month and many camps abutted snow-capped peaks. The many trails from Iraq were littered with abandoned possessions that no longer served any utility--broken-down cars, appliances, family heirlooms, furniture, suitcases that had become too heavy to carry, and tragically, people who were unable to

withstand the rigors of the march and simply stopped walking, waiting for the cold to end their suffering.

Within days of its insertion, the 10th Special Forces Group organized and identified camps and drop zones, provided medical assistance as needed, and made plans for security requirements. The 10th Special Forces Group formed the first element of what became Joint Task Force Alpha (JTF-A), whose principal mission was resupply of the Kurdish refugees. JTF-A was based in Incirlik, Turkey, along with the headquarters for Combined Task Force (CTF) PROVIDE COMFORT, initially commanded by MGen James Jamerson, USAF, and subsequently by LtGen John M. Shalikashvili, USA.

On 9 April, the 24th Special Operations Capable Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU(SOC)) was into its third month of a planned six-month Mediterranean deployment when the call went out to respond to the rapidly developing situation in northern Iraq. Embarked aboard the USS *Guadalcanal* (LPH 7), USS *Austin* (LPD 4), and USS *Charleston* (LKA 113), the 24th MEU(SOC) was in the midst of a landing operation in Sardinia, Italy, when the commander, U.S. Sixth Fleet, ordered the amphibious ready group to begin backload, depart the waters of the western Mediterranean, and proceed to the port of Iskenderun, Turkey, for duty with CTF PROVIDE COMFORT. The backload was completed the next morning and the three ships arrived on station on 13 April. The following morning, the 24th MEU(SOC) and Amphibious Squadron 8 (PhibRon-8), commanded by Capt Dean Turner, USN, reported to MGen Jamerson and his deputy, BGen Anthony C. Zinni.

The mission was clear. The 24th MEU(SOC) was to establish a forward support base at Silopi, Turkey, from which helicopters could begin to carry supplies to refugee camps in the mountains. Implied in the mission was the establishment of a forward arming and refueling point (FARP) and a Marine air control detachment to run the airfield. By 15 April, HMM-264, the aviation combat element of the 24th MEU(SOC), had displaced itself 450 miles inland, set up its base, and had begun its humanitarian mission with 23 helicopters in support of BGen Potter and JTF-A (see "Into a Sea of Refugees" insert). During the following two weeks the Squadron would deliver over 1 million pounds of relief supplies and fly in excess of 1,000 hours without mishap.



Rapidly changing events revealed that the entire 24th MEU(SOC) would be required ashore in short time. Within a few days, the unit was operating out of Silopi, Turkey, preparing to be part of the security force that was to enter northern Iraq. On 19 April, Marines provided the security element for a meeting between LtGen Shalikashvili and an Iraqi delegation at the Habur Bridge border crossing in Iraq. At that meeting, Iraqi representatives were informed that coalition forces intended to enter Iraq on 20 April; the mission was to be humanitarian; there was no intent to engage Iraqi forces; Iraqi forces were to offer no resistance; and a Military Coordination Committee would be formed for the purpose of maintaining direct communication with both Kurdish and Iraqi authorities.

While plans to cross the border to the west of the city of Zakhu were being finalized on 19 April, allied coalition forces received instructions from their respective governments to proceed towards the Turkish-Iraqi border. CTF PROVIDE COMFORT responded to the orders of the Supreme Allied Commander Europe, Gen John R. Galvin, USA, the unified commander in Germany who had cognizance over all operations in the area, to proceed into northern Iraq and establish security zones to expedite the safe transfer of refugees from their mountain havens to the countryside they had originated from. LtGen Shalikashvili quickly activated Joint Task Force-Bravo (JTF-B), which would be responsible for this part of the mission. Its focus would be to neutralize the Iraqi Army in the northern region of Iraq and implement a plan to reintroduce 500,000 Kurdish refugees back into that country.

The problem for JTF-B was in creating conditions in Iraq that would entice the refugees to return voluntarily to the region. Climatic conditions are such that there are only two seasons in the region-winter and summer. Coalition forces were already witnessing winter's last gasp. Soon the mountain streams, which were the main source of water for many of the refugees, would dry up under the intense heat of summer. For obvious reasons, it was critical that the refugees be out of the hills before this occurred.

On 17 April, MajGen Jay M. Garner, USA, arrived in Silopi from his post as deputy commanding general, V Corps, in Germany, with the lead element of what was to become the JTF-B staff. At the outset his troop list consisted of the 24th MEU(SOC), which was given the task of conducting a heliborne assault into a valley to the east of Zakhu on the morning of 20 April. Overhead U.S. Air Force A-10s, F-15s, and F-16s provided air cover, while the Iraqi Army watched precariously from the high ground surrounding Zakhu. Previously inserted force reconnaissance Marines and Navy SEALs had established observation posts along the main avenues of approach and key terrain around the city. Assault helicopters were deployed carrying Marines from Battalion Landing Team 2/8 (BLT 2/8), commanded by LtCol Tony L. Corwin, to designated zones near the city. Reports from the recon units confirmed the presence of a significant number of Iraqi reinforcements billeted near the MEU command element. Consequently, LtCol Corwin sent emissaries to the Iraqi positions with clear instructions concerning the movements he expected the Iraqi Army to make in withdrawing from the region and the city of Zakhu. As a demonstra-

tion of humanitarian intent Marines erected 12 refugee tents before nightfall on 20 April in what was to ultimately become one of the largest resettlement camps ever built. Patience and firmness paid off within a few days as the Iraqi Army issued orders to withdraw. By nightfall on 23 April, Marines occupied the key positions and road network around the city.

MajGen Garner and his JTF-B staff were headquartered along with the command element of the 24th MEU(SOC) in the deserted headquarters of the Iraqi 44th Infantry Division. Garner immediately directed the bridge and road leading from the border to Zakhu to be opened for traffic. This was particularly significant as the Habur Bridge at the border would become the only means by which surface convoys could pass from Turkey into Iraq.

On 22 April, LtCol Jonathan Thompson, commanding officer, 45th Commando, Royal Marines (United Kingdom), and LtCol Cees Van Egmond, 1st Air Combat Group, Royal Netherlands Marines, reported for duty to MajGen Garner, who placed both units under the tactical control of the 24th MEU(SOC). With a total force of 3,400 Marines from three nations, MajGen Garner lost no time in developing a plan to rid Zakhu of Iraqi oppression.

Zakhu, a city of 150,000 under normal times, was a ghost town when coalition forces arrived there on 20 April. Fewer than 2,000 inhabitants remained. Those missing were still in the mountain camps of southern Turkey. Their homes had been looted and vandalized by the Iraqi Army, which continued pillaging local towns and villages as it retreated south.

Despite agreeing to withdraw his army, Saddam was not about to surrender Zakhu without a last effort to retain control of the city. He did so by ordering 300 "policemen" into Zakhu to maintain law and order and protect coalition forces from Kurdish rebels. Clearly, the few residents left in Zakhu were still being terrorized. Something had to be done.

Col Richard Naab, USA, the recently assigned head of the Military Coordination Committee, met daily with BGen Danoun Nashwan of the Iraqi Army to explain coalition intent and expectations. After several meetings, a demarche was drafted and released on 24 April. Its key points are listed below:

Iraqi armed forces will continue to withdraw to a point 30 kilometers in all directions from Zakhu (in other words, out of artillery range).

Iraqi police will be immediately withdrawn from Zakhu.

Iraq will be allowed no more than 50 uniformed policemen in Zakhu at any one time. They would have to be indigenous to the region, carry only one pistol, and display coalition force identification badges at all times.

On 26 April coalition forces will enter Zakhu for the purpose of verifying compliance and would begin to regularly patrol the city.

Coalition forces will establish a security zone complete with checkpoints within a 30-kilometer radius around Zakhu. No weapons other than those of coalition forces will be permitted in the zone.

No members of the Iraqi Army will be permitted in the security zone--in or out of uniform--without approval from the Military Coordination Committee.

Shortly after the issuing of this demarche, the Iraqi police were observed boarding buses headed south. While the full impact of the demarche was being studied by the Iraqis, LtGen Shalikashvili and MajGen Garner lost no time in directing the 24th MEU(SOC) to establish this security zone, which it was thought would permit the Kurds to consider coming out of the mountains without fear.

During the hours of darkness on 25 April, BLT 2/8 cordoned off the city from the south, east, and north, while Dutch Marines sealed off the western approaches and ensured the integrity of the bridges at the border. British Royal Marines from 45th Commando, having just arrived from Northern Ireland, were tasked with patrolling the streets of Zakhu, sending what few Iraqis remained scurrying for an escape route. By nightfall on 26 April, Zakhu enjoyed its first taste of freedom.

During this time, the resupply effort continued. On 26 April alone, HMM-264 delivered 24.5 tons of relief supplies to the refugees. They were soon augmented by helicopter assets from other coalition forces that had begun to arrive in the area, making operational the Combined Service Command (CSC) at Silopi, Turkey. Other reinforcements were forthcoming as well. On the morning of 27 April, the 3d Battalion, 325th (3/325) Airborne Combat Team, commanded by LtCol John Abizaid, was placed under the tactical control of the 24th MEU. The 18th Engineer Brigade, commanded by Col Steven Windsor, USA, reinforced by Naval Mobile Construction Battalion 133 (SeaBees), also arrived during this same timeframe, providing much needed relief for the Sailors and Marines of the 24th MEU(SOC) who, alone, had raised 1,100 tents in 10 days.

Another capability of critical importance throughout PROVIDE COMFORT was the presence of the U.S. State Department Disaster Assistance Relief Team headed by Fred Cuny, a former Marine. This team was critical in helping coordinate the actions of the many multinational government and nongovernmental organizations that played a role in the operation. Bolstered by years of expertise in such matters, Cuny was invaluable in prosecuting a humanitarian campaign that ultimately relocated 500,000 Kurds in 60 days.

24th MEU(SOC)'s MEU Service Support Group (MSSG-24), commanded by LtCol Richard T. Kohl, also showed its mettle early on by installing a reverse osmosis water purification unit and establishing medical/dental civic action projects in Zakhu. Almost overnight, the local hospital sprang to operating capability. Coalition engineers sought to restore electricity and water to a city that had been without for months. Stores slowly reopened and people once again took to the streets. (see "Pushing Logistics to the Limit" insert). These

initiatives were key in convincing the citizens of Zakhu that this was an army, perhaps the first in memory, that only meant them goodwill.

It didn't take long for the message to reach the mountains. Local community leaders and Pesh Merge chiefs began arriving in Zakhu to verify for themselves the changes underway and to give proper guidance to their people in the mountains. The allies referred to Zakhu and its growing refugee camp to the east as the coalition security zone. As the demarche noted, it was to be free of visible weapons, rules which were meant to apply to Kurds as well as the Iraqi Army.

At first, only a trickle of refugees dared to leave the camps to begin the trip back to Zakhu. Soon, however, as news of a secure city inside Iraq spread to the mountains, many residents slowly began to return to their former homes. A large number of refugees, however, still refused to budge from their hilltop havens. They were waiting to see what coalition forces would do next.

As Zakhu was being repopulated, coalition leaders decided that the next move should be to the east. Already, British and French forces had probed in that direction and plans to extend the zone eastward were put into effect. First, 45th Commando pushed to the town of Batufa, a small but strategically important city, then onto the airfield at Sirsenk, another important objective, and finally to the city of Al Amadiyah, a veritable fortress dating back some 3,000 years; this became the eastern limit of what was referred to as the British sector under the 3d Commando Brigade, commanded by BGen A.M. Keeling, OBE. Again, the instruction to the Iraqis via the Military Coordination Committee was clear and unequivocal--back off and let us do our job. Compliance occurred shortly thereafter.

One area that received special consideration was Saddam Hussein's palace complex, which was a series of partially completed mansions intended for use by Iraq's elite. These modern structures, erected on choice properties, were guarded by elements of the Iraqi army. Iraqi negotiators did not want coalition forces to take possession of these properties and an agreement was reached that allowed Iraq to retain control of the palaces, maintain a small numerically controlled security force on the grounds, and that coalition forces would not enter the properties.

Of far greater value to coalition forces, however, was the airfield at Sirsenk. The airfield was a DESERT STORM-damaged runway, which, when repaired, could accommodate C-130 aircraft. The airfield was being looked at as the key supply point for JTF-B in northern Iraq. Soldiers, Sailors, and Airmen worked feverishly for six days to repair the damaged runway. By 14 May, the airfield was operational, and a key logistical forward base in Iraq had been established.

Another key element in PROVIDE COMFORT's logistical network involved Marines and Sailors from the 3d Force Service Support Group (FSSG), which was based with III Marine Expeditionary Force on Okinawa. Early in the operation it became apparent that additional skills resident in the landing support battalion of an FSSG would be needed. Consequently, a request was sent from CTF headquarters asking for two companies to meet combat service support requirements. As the flow of relief supplies grew, the need for this unit became

greater. In response, Contingency Marine Air-Ground Task Force 1-91 (CMAGTF 1-91), under the command of LtCol Robert L. Bailey, was formed and flown in theater from Okinawa, setting up initially at Silopi. CMAGTF 1-91 organized CSS detachments that were spread out over the entire CTF operating area. Throughout the operation, CMAGTF 1-91's element remained headquartered in Silopi, providing combat service support detachments to various nodes in the relief supply network that had been established.

The expansion of our security zone, however, was still incomplete. Coalition forces continued to press eastward, beyond Al Amadiyah. French forces, under the command of BGen Xavier Prevost, pushed out to the town of Suri, which was to become the easternmost point of advance for the allies. The famous 8th Regiment Parachutiste d'Infanterie de Marine, reinforced with medical and humanitarian capabilities (not to mention a field bakery capable of producing 20,000 loafs of bread per day); formed the centerpiece of the French sector.

By this time, the skies of northern Iraq were becoming crowded. French Pumas, British Sea Kings and Gazelles, Dutch Alouettes, Italian and Spanish Hueys, Spanish CH-47s, and American transport, cargo, and attack helicopters of every type and variety contributed heavily to the humanitarian and security missions. The 4th Brigade of the 3d Infantry Division, commanded by Col Butch Whitehead, USA, reported for duty on 26 April. This maneuver element gave Gen Garner the "eyes" he needed--day and night--to see exactly what the Iraqi Army was up to in the south. To this day, these units still patrol the skies of the coalition zone, reminding both Kurds and Iraqis that there will be no repeat of last winter's human tragedy.

By 10 May 1991, the coalition security zone, from east to west, was 160 kilometers in length and was secured by the physical presence of allied forces. This was an important point for the Kurds who maintained that they would only return to those areas that were physically occupied by coalition forces. As dramatic as it was, the expansion of the zone to the east did not have the desired effect of launching a human exodus from the camps back into Iraq. By now, however, the reason was becoming clear. The majority of refugees in Turkey came from the city of Dahuk, the provincial capital located 40 kilometers south of the allies security zone. Kurds were willing to use resettlement camps as temporary way stations en route to their former homes, but they were unwilling to accept these camps as a permanent solution. Thus, moving towards this city became the key to resolving the refugee problem in southern Turkey where approximately 350,000 refugees still remained.

In early May, overflights of Dahuk revealed that the city was abandoned except for elements of the Iraqi Army. During normal times, Dahuk is a bustling city of 350,000, modern by contrast to most other villages or cities in the security zone. Two major roads intersect just west of the city, one going to Zakhu, the other towards Al Amadiyah. Built for the efficient movement of Iraq's army, these roadways were also the economic lifeline of the region.

The remaining refugees in the mountains were getting restless, waiting and watching for any sign that coalition forces would move south. On the 12th of

May, perhaps celebrating their new found freedom, 1,500 Kurds demonstrated in Zakhu calling for allies to move towards the city of Dahuk.

Soon after, JTF-B ordered the 24th MEU(SOC), reinforced by the 3d Battalion, 325th Regiment Airborne Combat Team, to move south and establish checkpoints to the west and east of the city at the edge of the allied security zone (see "BLT 2/8 Moves South" insert). Ongoing negotiations between the Iraqis and the Military Coordination Committee resulted in an agreement that would allow humanitarian and logistical forces to enter the city along with United Nations (U.N.) forces and nongovernment organizations. Combat forces were to advance no further beyond their present positions. In return, Iraq agreed to withdraw all armed forces and secret police from Dahuk and take up new positions 15 kilometers to the south of the city. On 20 May, a small convoy of coalition vehicles entered Dahuk and established a forward command post in an empty hotel in the heart of the city. The security zone now extended 160 kilometers east to west and 60 kilometers north to south below the Turkish-Iraqi border.

Although there was considerable doubt as to whether this would be enough to attract refugees from the camps, the presence of an airborne combat team to the east of Dahuk and BLT 2/8 to the west, the patrols of the 18th Military Police Brigade throughout JTF-B's main supply routes, the increasing capabilities of Italian and Spanish forces around Zakhu, and the presence of British, Dutch, and French forces nearby, all seemed to convince Kurdish leaders that the time was right to repopulate the security zone. Thousands of Kurds began leaving their temporary shelters heading for Dahuk.

All available transportation was used during this movement. Many refugees walked, but once on the roads and footpaths, they helped one another using cars, mule-driven carts, buses, tractors, motorcycles--whatever could be found. Coalition forces sent teams of mechanics and fuel trucks into the mountains to provide assistance to those attempting to return home. Intermediary way stations were set up by civil affairs units under the command of Col John Easton, USMCR, JTF-B's chief of staff, to provide food, water, and medical assistance at various points along the journey.

By 25 May, the movement of refugees reached its peak. 55,200 refugees sought temporary refuge in what had become three camps in the valley east of Zakhu. The activity was feverish, but incredibly well controlled. People who had never dreamed of an operation of this magnitude were thrust together to make critical decisions. They overcame language, cultural, and ethnic barriers. Nongovernmental workers from all parts of the world joined with military forces to make this effort successful. Even U.N. representatives joined in the race against time to get the Kurdish people out of the mountains. By 2 June, the U.N. had taken over the administration of both refugee camps from coalition forces, which by this time numbered over 13,000 personnel.

At the 90-day mark, it was clear that coalition objectives were achieved. Kurdish refugees were out of the mountains and either back in their villages of origin, on their way there, or in camps built by coalition forces. In the Mediterranean, the USS *Theodore Roosevelt* (CVN 71), which had flown air

cover over northern Iraq for much of PROVIDE COMFORT, was relieved on station by the USS *Forrestal* (CV 59). At Silopi, Turkey, the Combined Support Command, under the direction of BGen Hal Burch, USA, was now functioning as the logistical pivot for all supplies flowing into Iraq.

On 8 June, JTF-A was deactivated and BGen Potter's troops began their retrograde out of Turkey. On 12 June, the Civil Affairs Command was also deactivated.

The remaining days of coalition presence in northern Iraq were devoted to continuing to stabilize the region and reassuring Kurdish leaders that although coalition forces would soon be leaving, this act would not signify a change in the resolve of the allied forces to support the Kurdish people. It was also a period of planning for the allies, who were now tasked with retrograding their forces and material from northern Iraq. At this time the unannounced date for coalition forces to be out of Iraq was 15 July. A second demarche was drawn up and presented to the Iraqi government outlining the type of conduct coalition forces expected of Iraq in the future. In essence, its terms were as follows:

Iraqi fixed- and rotary-wing aircraft were not to fly north of the 36th parallel, which is approximately 60 kilometers south of Dahuk.

The Iraqi Army and secret police were not to enter the security zone.

A coalition ground combat force, composed of forces representing several nations, would be maintained across the border in Silopi, Turkey.

Coalition aircraft, both fixed- and rotary-wing, would continue to patrol the skies above the security zone.

The Military Coordination Committee would continue to monitor the security zone and Iraqi compliance of the terms of the demarche.

In the ensuing days, coalition forces continued their drawdown. On the morning of 15 July, Marines from BLT 2/8 along with paratroopers from 3/325 Airborne Combat Team were the last combat elements to withdraw from northern Iraq. In the early afternoon, the American flag was lowered for the last time at JFT-B headquarters at Zakhu. Minutes later, U.S. military leaders, who had entered Iraq on 20 April, walked across the bridge over the Habur River, leaving Iraq for the last time. Two Air Force F-16s followed by two A-10s made low passes over the bridge as the group made its way across the bridge. On 19 July, the 24th MEU(SOC), now back aboard amphibious shipping watched as the city of Iskenderun and the Turkish horizon slipped into the sea. After a six-month deployment, it too was finally on its way home.

The author wishes to thank SSgt Lee J. Tibbets for his assistance in preparing this article.

Into a Sea of Refugees: HMM-264

by LtCol Joseph A. Byrtus, Jr.

Small camp sites dotted the countryside below as the aircraft followed the steep valley northeastward. From 500 feet above ground level, the camp at Isikveren was overwhelming with 80,000 starving and freezing people tightly congregated on the steep mountain side in a patchwork of garish blue, white, and orange tents. A pall of smoke from thousands of small cooking fires hung perhaps 20 feet above the camp in a thin, neat layer. Because every square foot of land suitable for landing was occupied by refugees, the Super Stallions had to land one at a time in one of the few level areas not blocked by the tall, defoliated trees that dotted the camp. As the lead aircraft transitioned to landing from a high hover, a landing zone was cleared below as people ran from the rotor wash, followed by their tents and meager belongings. Once safely on deck, the crew inside the aircraft attempted to unload as rapidly as possible so that the next aircraft could land. Initially, the crowd was kept back by the rotor wash of the aircraft.

Within moments, however, the crowd surrounding the CH-53E had doubled or tripled in size. As the first pallet was pushed from the ramp, a crowd of 10,000 or more rushed the aircraft from all sides in a desperate dash for food and water. Fearing the results of a mob scene at the rear of his aircraft, the aircraft commander lifted into a low hover and slowly air-taxied its way forward, temporarily blowing the Kurds back and clearing an area below the aircraft for the remaining pallets to fall. The second and third aircraft followed the first's lead and delivered their loads from a low hover too. Once this was accomplished all three helos departed the refugee camp and headed back to Silopi to recover the MEU commanding officer and his ground combat commander for the return trip to the USS *Guadalcanal*. The return flight, however, was diverted to Incerlik, Turkey, for the evening as reduced visibility precluded a return to the USS *Guadalcanal*.

BLT 2/8 Moves South

by LtCol Tony L. Corwin

The beginning of May began as busy as the last two weeks of April. Companies E and F were each tasked to provide one rifle platoon with either a combined antiarmor team or a fast attack vehicle team attached to replace allied forces controlling roadblocks to the west and south of the city, as these forces prepared to move east. Company G was tasked with providing a platoon for security purposes at the Zakhu hospital. Our light armored infantry (LAI)

platoon continued its reconnaissance along the southern portion of our main supply route. The heavy LAI section, consisting of two 25mm light armored vehicles (LAV-25s), an antitank variant (LAV-AT), a logistical variant (LAV-L), and the 105mm howitzer platoon from H Battery, was attached to the 3d Royal Marine Commando Brigade to conduct operations in the central and eastern areas of northern Iraq.

As negotiations over the size of the security zone continued between CTF PROVIDE COMFORT and Iraqi officials, coalition forces focused their attention on expanding the security zone to the east and south. The 3d Commando, with the 3d Battalion, 325th Regiment Airborne Combat Team attached, and the Dutch Royal Marines were assigned an area of responsibility to the east while the BLT prepared to move south.

On the morning of 4 May, a platoon from Company E relieved Company F at the southern roadblock, allowing it to begin its movement southward. Company F was mounted in assault amphibious vehicles and reinforced by one LAI section and two combined antiarmor teams, with an 81mm mortar platoon and H Battery providing direct fire support.

Each time the Company moved forward, it forced an Iraqi company ahead of it to withdraw. Roadblocks were also established along the route to prevent any unauthorized movement north toward Zakhu.

After reaching its final destination, an area five kilometers northwest of Summayl, Company G was inserted by helicopter to strengthen Company F's position. With sufficient forces forward and a safe zone cleared north to Zakhu, BLT 2/8's command element and Company H moved south on 9 May to Muqbal where they established a fire support base.

This pushed logistics to the limit. Both military and commercial vehicles had to be employed to keep supplies moving from Zakhu to Muqbal. To lessen this strain, the BLT employed a number of civilian refuelers, but primarily made use of Battery H's organic five-ton truck assets.

While this consolidation of forces continued in the Muqbal area, plans were developed for an unopposed and opposed seizure of Dahuk, depending on what circumstances dictated. Although Iraqi forces remained outside the 30-kilometer buffer they agreed on regarding Zakhu, their continued presence in the region was still somewhat of a destabilizing factor. When the decision was made that BLT 2/8 would push on towards Dahuk, it was assigned the 29th British Commando artillery battalion and an Italian special forces company. The British artillery battalion significantly enhanced the BLT's indirect fire support capability with 3 firing batteries, each with 6 lightweight 105mm howitzers with ranges extending from 15 to 30 kilometers. The Italian special forces company that the BLT received operated and trained with our reconnaissance and scout sniper platoons. By incorporating the Italians into our operations this way, we were capable of maintaining an active reconnaissance and surveillance presence around Dahuk at all times.

The BLT remained at the Muqbal fire support base from 9 May to 15 June, while the city of Dahuk was being resettled by the Kurds. To provide the companies relief from static defensive duty, a rotation system was established to

move units every six days from the forward checkpoint back to Zakhu and Muqbal for rear area and perimeter security duty. Companies rotating to Muqbal were afforded the opportunity to partake in live fire exercises, squad-size patrols, and in organized athletic events.

During the last weeks of May, the BLT initiated planning for a phased retrograde of all units back to Iskenderun, Turkey. On 1 June, Company H was the first unit to leave Muqbal. The company was tasked with providing security for equipment and cargo at the port facility and assist in the washdown of BLT vehicles. For the next two weeks selected equipment, vehicles, and personnel retrograded to Iskenderun via Silopi. On 15 June, responsibility for the BLT sector was transitioned to Italian forces, and the remaining combat elements of the BLT retrograded to Silopi. BLT 2/8's mission was complete.

Pushing Logistics to the Limit: MSSG-24

by LtCol Richard T. Kohl

Initially, MSSG-24 established a combat service support detachment to the forward support base it had previously set up at Silopi, Turkey, by mid April. The task to assist displaced civilians was right up MSSG-24's alley. The unit possessed organic motor transport, supply, medical, dental, and engineer detachments that could easily task organize for such operations, while simultaneously providing logistics sustainment for the MEU. From the forward support base, logistics requirements were moved via helicopter and tactical vehicle convoy, to logistics control points located in the rear of forward-deployed units. Replenishment of depleted stocks from the continental United States (CONUS) and intratheater sources was continuous.

Throughout the operation, MSSG-24 provided direct support for 24th MEU(SOC) and all the other allied forces in JTF-B at one time or another. This was due to the fact that most other units involved in PROVIDE COMFORT did not come with an organic logistical support capability built into them, as the 24th MEU(SOC) did. As a consequence, the 15 days of logistics sustainability that Marine doctrine requires an MSSG to prepare for clearly stretched capabilities to the limit as it had to operate continuously in a combat-intense environment without much assistance for approximately two to three weeks and support more units than normally expected to support. The MSSG (-) for this operation consisted of 251 Marines and Sailors located more than 450 miles from the port of Iskenderun. This is believed to be the furthest inland an entire MSSG has ever been established.

Captain Holcomb served with the 2d Battalion, 7th Marines, in the Persian Gulf. In the fall of 1990, he received a letter from Mrs Ann Dyer's third-grade class at Montague School in Santa Clara, California. Mrs Dyer's students asked Captain Holcomb a number of questions about Desert Shield in particular and war in general. This letter is Captain Holcomb's answer to those questions.

Why We Fought

by Captain Grant K. Holcomb, USMC

Marine Corps Gazette, April 1991

It was wonderful to get your letters. I cannot thank you enough for your concern. I hope to answer all of your many questions. You are our future; it is important that you know what is happening in Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Iraq. This must never happen again.

I will start by answering your toughest question first: "Have you started a war yet?" I am here to stop a war, not start it. Your letters remind me well of why I am here. You were free to write what you wanted, send it around the world without it being stopped, and you never have to worry about being threatened for what you wrote. A child cannot do that in Iraq and can no longer do that in Kuwait. Far worse than the loss of freedoms is the total loss of value of a human life. To the leaders of Iraq, death is as much a part of government business as garbage collection. This is a hard thing to ask of you, but briefly imagine living every second of your life in fear of being killed. You are so lucky to be safe and free in America.

I am here in Saudi Arabia to protect this country from Saddam Hussein, the leader of Iraq. He became their leader by killing many people. The Iraqi people had no choice in the matter, they have no vote or other say in their government like we do. Saddam Hussein needs large sums of money to stay in power. He seeks the power of controlling everyone around him. To get the money he needs he must have more control over the world's oil supply. He sent his army into Kuwait to take its oil and money. He would control one-half of the world's oil supply if he could also take Saudi Arabia's oil with his army.

Saddam Hussein is more evil than I can possibly describe in writing. He started by killing his own brother at age 10. He has killed entire cities of his own people with poison gas. He has more people killed weekly in Iraq and Kuwait than are in your classroom as you read this letter. When his army went into Kuwait, they killed far more people everyday than are in your entire school.

What should the United States do now? There are some very hard questions to answer about how to deal with a murderer. The best way I know how to answer this is to try to answer the following questions:

1. Should the United States let Iraq destroy other nations?
2. Should the United States let Iraq inflate the price of oil or let it cut oil off from nations it does not like?

When Iraq destroyed Kuwait, great numbers of people were, and are still, killed. The taking of human life is the toughest subject there is to discuss. I am an officer in the United States Marine Corps. My personal belief is that the preservation of human life is the absolute most important value. As a Marine, part of the most successful war fighting forces in the world's and United States' 200-year history, this value may seem a contradiction. Just like a police officer breaks the speed limit to catch a speeder, I may be forced to kill a killer. All the wishing, hoping, praying, and protesting by anyone does not change the fact that Saddam Hussein considers murder an acceptable act. If someone was in your classroom trying to kill you, I would stop them. I would do so even if it meant I had to die in the process. Your lives are that valuable to me, and I do not even know you. I do not know the children of Kuwait either. Are their lives any less valuable than your own? No, they are not. All lives are of equal value. This presents a problem. What about Saddam Hussein's life?

I am so close to where Saddam Hussein's army is killing people that I could be there in the time it takes for you to read this letter. I constantly think about justifying his death. My own possible death makes me very sensitive to how precious life is. I would like some day to have a son or daughter in Mrs. Dyer's classroom. How do I justify being here? Imagine a large shark. To a shark, it is not a murderer. It does what it must to stay alive. It does not think it has done anything wrong when it hurts a person. Sharks have their place in the world; you must respect them when in their domain. However, what if you found a shark in your swimming pool? Would you invite your friends over to come swimming and have them eaten? You have the power to protect your friends. Saddam Hussein is a shark in the world's swimming pool. Unfortunately, and against our strongest value, removing the shark from the pool will kill it.

To answer your second question, you must understand the role oil plays in your world. If I could snap fingers and make everything disappear that either directly or indirectly needed oil for it to exist, you would be sitting naked in the dirt. I am not here in Saudi Arabia representing American oil companies; I am here by choice to protect lives. However, I understand the direct impact oil has on human life. It keeps us warm, fed, housed, and free to move. Its uses in producing electricity, heat, lubrication, medicine, and plastics affect everyone directly everyday. Those few Americans who protest my being here forget very quickly. Without oil they could not drive to where they protest or get their opinion on TV, radio, or paper without the oil to provide power to do so. If the price of oil gets too high, they cannot then afford to even express their

opinion. No one could afford to hear it either. Ask Mrs. Dyer what a hypocrite is.

If Saddam Hussein controlled most of the world's oil, imagine the power he would have. Look at what he has done to his own people. Children near your age are forced to carry machineguns and fight. Since Russia is going through great changes, the United States is the only country in the world with a military force strong enough to stop his plan of controlling the oil. There are many countries that do not have the money to buy enough oil if it gets too expensive. Already, countries that need oil for heating during the winter have many freezing deaths, mostly children. Do we let Saddam Hussein indirectly kill people all over the world? No, we do not! I am a Marine, and I will stop Saddam Hussein. You can be very proud of your Marines, Soldiers, Sailors and Airmen who are here in Saudi Arabia. We know what we have to do, the risks to our lives, and how important to the people of the world that we be successful.

Now that I hope I have answered your hardest question, I will answer the rest of them. Several of you wrote, "Is it hot?" I am from Florida and thought 95 degrees at the beach was hot. Since I got here 59 days ago the average temperature has been 115 degrees with the high being 120 degrees. At first it was unbearable. It is like looking into the oven to see what is for dinner, but it stays that hot all the time. Since my unit is from Twentynine Palms, CA, my Marines already know how to survive in the desert. You must force yourself to drink large quantities of water, even if your stomach hurts. Just like a car dies when its radiator leaks out its cooling water, so do humans. I consider myself a professional, and I put a great deal of pride into what I do, but the heat makes you slow and hesitant to work hard. We were forced to sleep all day and work all night to keep from killing anyone. Now we are all so used to working in 115 degrees that 90 degrees feels like winter is just around the corner. It is now starting to get very cold at night and soon it will be freezing at night. They will be issuing winter clothing and sleeping bags to us soon. All the Marines here really appreciate how wonderful America is now that we have been here so long.

Many of you asked where I sleep. I sleep right on the sand. I recently got a 1/2-inch-thick air mat in the mail that I sleep on. Since there is nothing but soft sand where we are, I do not worry much about rocks in my back. We have no tents, and since it does not rain here, we do not need them. However, I have woken up recently wet from the dew that forms at night. Things dry up in minutes when the sun comes up. I actually sleep very well and have gotten quite used to the ground. I do miss my pillow though; my neck hurts when I wake up. If you see pictures of tents in Time magazine, remember I am a Marine. The Army has much more money for tents, cots, and other such comforts. Besides, me and my Marines are doing fine and would rather spend taxpayers' money on more weapons than unnecessary personal comforts.

You asked in your letters if there were lots of people, houses, stores, and hotels. Since my Marines are not allowed to associate with or use Saudi facilities, we really never see anyone. For hundreds of miles in every direction, there is nothing but rolling sand. I have driven through three cities that

look just like ours to include Kentucky Fried Chicken, Hardees, etc. I have seen signs for a Holiday Inn. The Saudis own and live in homes like ours.

We occasionally see a herd of camels led by Bedouin tribesmen. They live all over the desert here. They also herd sheep, which eat the very short grassy shrubs that grow every 10 feet or so in the sand. The Bedouins are a very rugged, proud people. They have been extremely supportive and appreciative of us being here. We have gone out of our way to be respectful of their culture. This is their home, and we are only temporary guests.

You asked if there were bees, lizards, and other bugs here. Absolutely, yes! There are so many scorpions here and we regularly have Marines get stung. There is a black scorpion that grows to several inches in length. I keep one in a can that is so big it can hold a saltine cracker in its claws while it eats it. (I did not know scorpions ate crackers.) The scorpions are very dangerous because their poison is so strong. There are at least six types of poisonous snakes. We have caught a cobra, two horned vipers, and another type of viper since we got here. They like to hide in our uniforms when we take them off. The ants are amazing here; they are strong, fast, and eat anything.

There is also a giant black beetle, but it is harmless. I woke up last night because one crawled across my chest. The beetles like to get into our food. They can chew their way through cardboard. There is a very large lizard out here, about two feet long, that digs very deep holes in the ground. We rarely see them. We thought there were no rats until we caught one running across the sand trying to steal a package of Lifesavers. I have not experienced any mosquitoes, but the flies are terrible. They are afraid of nothing and like to get into your mouth. We have all learned to check our clothes, boots and packs for scorpions and snakes and have learned to survive with our new "friends."

I have to tell one story about SSgt Gonzalez, who works for me. We had driven to a new position at night so the Iraqi army would have a hard time knowing where we were. When we were through setting up our operations center he sat down and leaned back to rest. A six-inch scorpion stung him in the hand. He said the pain was instantaneous and in a short time he started to lose the feeling in his arm and shoulder. We immediately radioed for a helicopter to fly him to the Marine Corps hospital. The helicopter was five hours late picking him up. It almost ran out of gas and had to land. After it refueled, it crashed seconds after it took off again. No one was badly hurt. A truck finally picked him up at the crash site and rushed him to the hospital. While the truck was driving, the back blew off and almost threw him on the highway. When he finally got to the hospital, it turns out he was also sick, from food poisoning. Since the hospital had just been set up, the new doctors did not know the best way to treat a scorpion sting. It may sound horrible, but we laughed for days-if none of that could kill the staff sergeant, Saddam Hussein surely could not either!

One of you asked if I wear Army boots. Absolutely not. I am a Marine, and I wear combat boots. The boots may look the same to the casual observer, but it is what is inside them that makes the difference. The Marine Corps has never lost a major battle in its 214-year history. I am confident that if Saddam

Hussein forces us to fight him, he will see that the Marine Corps is to war what Michael Jordan is to basketball.

Many of you asked me what I eat. We are issued three times a day a small rectangular, heavy, green plastic bag called a meal-ready-to-eat (MRE). The MREs come in a case of 12. Each case has the same 12 meals: diced turkey, ham slices, pork patty, beef patty, beef stew, chicken a la king, frankfurters, chicken loaf, meat balls with BBQ sauce, beef slices and BBQ diced with gravy. Each package has crackers, peanut butter or cheese, cake, salt, pepper, sugar, coffee, gum, matches, toilet paper, and a candy bar. Some meals have beans in tomato sauce or applesauce. The ones we eat were made in 1985. I have lost 20 pounds since I got here, so that should tell you something about how good it tastes. Some evenings trucks come with hot food, but to be honest, many of the meals we have eaten, we have not been able to give a name. Some type of meat with noodles and sauce. I really miss McDonald's and my wife's great cooking. For the first time in my 31 years of living, I wish I had a plate of vegetables. I would eat a giant bowl of green beans, broccoli, or corn if I could get it. I also miss fresh salads. I have to stop; this is making me very hungry.

One of you asked if I like my job and if I was having fun. I have to be very honest. There have been a few occasions where I have never been happier (only a few, however). As an officer I really love working with my Marines, I care very much for my men. I show them respect, keep them informed, and do my best to protect them. When they go out of their way to show me they appreciate and respect me, it makes it all worthwhile. Everyone wants to feel they have value and that their existence makes a difference. I feel that way now. I have been a Marine since I was 17 years old, and now I make decisions that affect the lives of 900 men. I love being in charge and leading strong, well-trained, very disciplined warriors. My country needs me, and my job makes me feel important.

Many of you ask what I do. I am a senior captain in a Marine Corps infantry battalion. An infantry battalion is made up of five companies with roughly 900 Marines total. We are a ground fighting force, meaning we do not have tanks, artillery (cannons), or aircraft. These weapons do, however, come under our control in combat. My position would put me between the principal and a senior teacher if your school was a battalion. The principal would tell me what he or she wanted and I would carry out those instructions by directing the teachers. As the assistant operations officer, I have 14 Marines who work directly for me. Most of my time is spent planning combat missions. Another job I have is senior watch officer for the battalion's combat operations center. In that role, after directed by my commanding officer or operations officer, I either directly or indirectly control and monitor the actions of the battalion's Marines, and the tanks, artillery, aircraft, or other weapons that come under our control. When not rehearsing combat missions, I supervise the battalion's training to get my Marines ready. The best part of my job is when I get to train Marines. I have taken 300 Marines out to teach them how to shoot machine-guns. I teach a hand-to-hand combat class a few times a week to get my Ma-

rines even more prepared for that time when they may be forced to fight. Some days are very, very slow, and the only thing we do is clean our weapons, write letters, and exercise. Then we will go day and night for up to five days without any sleep rehearsing a possible combat mission. We even use our own Marines as the enemy to make it as realistic as we can. We are ready for Saddam Hussein.

One of you asked how I was. First of all, thank you for asking. I feel great peace in my heart that I am doing the right thing. From the comments from my bosses and my Marines, I am confident I am ready to lead my Marines into combat. I have lost a lot of weight and no longer exercise like I want, so I feel I should do more to stay strong. That is one of the reasons I started a hand-to-hand combat class. I do not get much sleep each day, so I am always a little tired. Because I am tired of the same food, I am always a little hungry. I have had only one shower in 30 days, so I am very, very dirty. Your parents would not dare let me in their house. I smell so bad. My clothes are so dirty they stand up without a hanger. We have enough water for drinking and shaving, not showers. I am used to the heat. The real problem that I have is that I miss my best friend, my wife Joan. I love her so very much. I miss talking to her and holding her. God blessed me with a very special partner, and it is tough being so far away. I can't even make a phone call from where I am. Getting a letter from her gives me new energy and strength. The people of America should send mail and packages to the wives and girlfriends of the Marines, not Marines. They are the ones left alone with the pain of our absence.

I would like to end this letter by answering one last question. "Are you scared?" Many years ago when I was first a Marine, I would say yes. I have been all over the world for the past 11 years. I have seen several of my closest friends killed. I have held dead Marines in my arms, and I have survived several very close calls. When I am home in the United States, every minute is precious to me. I smile every second because I know I live in the most beautiful, free, and powerful country in the world. I am not scared right now. I am not afraid to die for what I believe in. There are a lot of people in this world who would do anything to destroy the United States. As long as they know there are strong, dedicated leaders in the United States who will do everything it takes to protect our society, we are safe. I have freely accepted my part in assuming that responsibility. There is no room for fear. If we are to keep our country great we must all be responsible citizens. Give more than you take from others. Care for everyone around you. Get involved in your government. Keep the environment clean so it will last. Stop the waste of our resources. We can stop being dependent on oil if we use coal properly or switch to hydrogen and solar energy. It starts with you, our children. God bless you. *Semper fidelis.*

During the Vietnam War the public watched videotape of the previous days action; during Desert Storm viewers around the world watched antiaircraft fire over Baghdad, Scud missile attacks, and the liberation of Kuwait City live via satellite hookups. Colonel Shotwell was the public affairs officer for I Marine Expeditionary Force during the Persian Gulf Conflict. In this article, he describes how the Marine Corps cooperated with the media.

The Fourth Estate as a Force Multiplier

by Colonel John M. Shotwell

Marine Corps Gazette, July 1991

Major commands at Camp Pendleton turn over just about every summer with varying degrees of attention from the news media. But the change of command scheduled for 8 August 1990, was expected to draw more media interest than normal. LtGen Walter E. Boomer was to assume command of I Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF), as well as Marine Corps Base Camp Pendleton. The Commandant of the Marine Corps (CMC), Gen A.M. Gray, was flying in as guest of honor and had agreed to a news conference that afternoon.

We researched and briefed the Commandant on the topics the media were likely to throw his way--a recent force reduction of civilian workers, hazardous waste disposal, freeway and airport proposals, and other persistent environmental and encroachment issues. But the one question all the journalists asked in one way or another was the one Gen Gray couldn't address at the time, even though he knew the answer--Were Camp Pendleton Marines going to the Gulf?

Six days earlier, when Saddam Hussein raped Kuwait, he set in motion a chain of events that seized the world's attention and held it fast. For the next several months every national leader, as well as just about every American family, would monitor each detail of the crisis through the news media. Perhaps no other event in world history has received as much public and media attention over a comparable time period.

The Marines from I MEF were very much in the eye of this typhoon of publicity throughout the crisis. During DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM, Marines would be featured frequently on all four television networks, would grace the covers of the major news magazines, and would figure prominently nearly every day on the front pages of America's newspapers.

Throughout the operation, correspondents frequently visited our area of responsibility, observed our training and buildup, and often remained overnight with our units. And during offensive operations a large pool of reporters literally lived with Marines for several weeks and crossed into Kuwait with them on G-day. They required logistical support, sometimes got in the way during

training, and presented a potential threat to operational security. But by telling the Marine Corps story to an audience voracious for news from the front they helped build and maintain the support of the American public.

The Adversary Relationship-Traditional and Healthy

The media coverage of the Vietnam War left a legacy of bitterness and mistrust between the press and the military. I often compare the process of trying to get the two institutions together with mating a wildcat and a pit bull. Public affairs officers can get bloodied in the process, but if we're successful, the progeny can be pretty interesting.

As the Head of the Media Branch at Headquarters Marine Corps during 1985-88, I was responsible for setting up military-media seminars at the Command and Staff College and Amphibious Warfare School. Typically these sessions included keynote speakers from the mainstream news media and panel discussions with members of the Pentagon press corps. I never ceased to be amazed at the fingerpointing antipathy that was often aroused and at the depth of suspicion that surfaced during discussions of media coverage of combat operations. Officers who'd never once had to confront either a reporter or an armed opponent blamed the media for losing the war for us in Vietnam, impugned their morals, and maligned their loyalties.

Retired Marine lieutenant general and former *New York Times* reporter Bernard E. Trainor has seen this adversary relationship from both sides. Last December he wrote in *Parameters*,

Today's officer corps carries as part of its cultural baggage a loathing for the press. . . . Like racism, anti-Semitism, and all forms of bigotry, it is irrational but nonetheless real. The credo of the military seems to have become 'duty, honor, country, and hate the media.'

Getting our officers to like the press was never a goal of these seminars. A certain amount of mutual wariness is probably healthy. What we tried to convey to the operators was the importance of planning for the presence of civilian reporters in the ranks. Whether they like it or not, commanders will have to deal with news media on the battlefield.

Falling Into the Media Pool

In 1983 military commanders effectively banned the media from the Grenada invasion. The press reacted with such loud righteous indignation, all but accusing the Pentagon of using the Bill of Rights for toilet paper, that the Department of Defense (DOD) formed a commission to study the issue. The Sidle Panel, composed of officers and representatives of the national news media, came up with a proposal that neither side particularly liked but both begrudgingly accepted.

The plan called for the Pentagon to fly a pool of about a dozen journalists to a combat zone prior to hostilities actually commencing, if possible. DOD drilled this plan with varying degrees of success over the next several years. Then in late 1989 the United States invaded Panama. The press pool was delayed for many hours while the world monitored the drama through Pentagon briefings and reports from journalists trapped in hotels. Once again the media howled like a scorned mistress.

The Pentagon had more time to get its act together when DESERT SHIELD began to unfold in August 1990. It helped that we deployed to a country that excluded news media as a matter of national policy. The Saudis, who normally don't permit media into their tightly guarded society, eventually did grant visas to a DOD-controlled media pool. By mid-August the world was watching American Service members sweating on tarmacs and loading docks somewhere in Saudi Arabia.

Within a few weeks the flood gates were opened and war correspondents, some seasoned but many green, poured into the country by the hundreds. We didn't know it at the time, but Marines would be on center stage of the world's biggest arena for five months before a single shot would be fired. And when you're in the spotlight, you might as well dance.

Wartime Public Affairs Themes

Not that the Marines who arrived in Saudi Arabia in mid-August were in a mood to pirouette. At the Jubail commercial port, the tension was thicker than the humidity as commanders struggled to offload vast quantities of weapons and equipment and field their units for combat. Troops sweltered in blistering metal warehouses waiting to move out. The threat of chemical warfare, terrorism, and heat stroke combined to add an edge to the anxieties that normally accompany a combat deployment. The last thing any of the commanders wanted to deal with at this time was a gaggle of journalists.

Most of the reporters, photographers, technicians, and producers followed the operation from the U.S. Central Command (CentCom) Joint Information Bureau (JIB) in Dhahran. The posh Dhahran International Hotel, with its cascading indoor fountains, sumptuous buffets, and preening doormen seemed a universe away from Marine Corps positions in the Saudi sands. The ubiquitous blue hemispheres seen so frequently as a backdrop behind television news reporters broadcasting from Saudi Arabia, and thought by many American viewers to be domes of a mosque, were in fact the cabanas at the Dhahran International swimming pool.

The media set up their news bureaus and satellite dishes at the International and haggled with JIB officers in their efforts to see U.S. forces and interview commanders and troops. The public affairs annex to CentCom's DESERT SHIELD operations order, published 14 August 1990, encouraged commanders to provide access to news media within the bounds of operational security (opsec) and outlined the media pool support guidelines. The guidance had little immediate impact on Marine Corps forces, who were too busy preparing for

imminent armed conflict to place much priority on media access. As a result, media access to Marines was somewhat limited during the first few days our forces were in Saudi Arabia. Many Americans following the crisis through the media at the time wondered: Where are our Marines? One of the people asking that question was Gen A. M. Gray.

LtGen Boomer released a message to his subordinate commanders on 21 August to encourage more news media access to Marines participating in DESERT SHIELD. It read, in part:

Operation DESERT SHIELD and related current events have captured worldwide attention and are the subject of intense news media scrutiny. CMC desires maximum media coverage of USMC (Marine Corps) participation within the bounds of opsec. This operation can demonstrate to Americans the flexibility, deployability, sustainability, and combat power of the Marine Corps and our combined arms capabilities. . . .

The long-term success of DESERT SHIELD depends in great measure on support of the American people. The news media are the tools through which we can tell Americans about the dedication, motivation, and sacrifices of their Marines. Commanders should include public affairs requirements in their operational planning to ensure that the accomplishments of our Marines are reported to the public.

Though DESERT SHIELD was only a couple of weeks old at the time, the message articulated the public affairs themes that persisted throughout our deployment:

Public support is vital to the success of the operation.

We gain and maintain that support by showing the public what their Marines are accomplishing.

The only way to show Marines to the American public is through the news media.

Public affairs should be incorporated into operational planning.

With these themes as a foundation, we began setting up as many news media visits as were feasible without interfering with operations and training. Our philosophy was simple. We were proud of our Marines and what they were doing in DESERT SHIELD, and we wanted to show them off. As long as we could give reporters the opportunity to spend time with our hard-charging Marines, who were the best advertisements for the Corps, the more likely we

were to receive positive news media coverage. To the extent possible, we tried to coincide media visits with training events. Live fire exercises were especially popular with photographers and camera crews looking for exciting visuals. Overnight stays with Marine units were actively sought after by reporters who wanted a taste of life with Marines in the desert.

These early reports of Marines in DESERT SHIELD were uniformly positive, given the tense situation. By the second week in September both Tom Brokaw and Dan Rather had broadcast highly favorable segments from Marine positions in Saudi Arabia for their nightly newscasts. CBS's Bob Simon had profiled 7th Marine Expeditionary Brigade commander MajGen John I. Hopkins. The public reaction to these accounts was astounding. We were showered with "Any Marine" mail from much of America.

An Atmosphere of Openness

LtGen Boomer set the tone for openness by availing himself to reporters from the first week he was in Saudi Arabia. Before the deployment ended, he had subjected himself to more than 40 lengthy interviews with a wide variety of media. One of his remarks in a *Newsweek* interview was later incorporated by President Bush into his address to the nation on 16 January 1991 following the commencement of DESERT STORM. The general's subordinate commanders followed suit and were frequently quoted in the national and international press.

After a honeymoon of gushing accounts of Marines in our first month in the Gulf, we began to sense that some reporters were looking for chinks in the armor. Our public affairs escorts reported that the media was beginning to ask more negative questions. Some Marines were responding with complaints about the heat, the uncertainty, the slow mail, and the lack of amenities. As the novelty of our presence in Saudi Arabia faded, and the threat of immediate hostilities diminished, these imperfections became news.

LtGen Boomer, in a message to his senior commanders on 11 September, described his pride in "the esprit, determination, and patriotism that have been demonstrated by the young warriors" featured in news media reports. As he went on:

. . . As our stay here lengthens I anticipate the news media interest will continue. I encourage commanders to accommodate members of the press corps in coordination with the public affairs office. . . . Your Marines and Sailors should be encouraged to discuss their day-to-day duties, routine tasks, and living conditions. In many cases these news media reports are our only link with friends, relatives, and supporters back home.

As your Marines are briefed prior to hosting news media, remind them that the shortage of amenities that may inconvenience them are a direct result of a rapid deployment into a potentially hostile zone that required

prioritization of shipment for food, water, weapons, and ammo. This will remain an austere deployment, but a concerted effort is underway to improve mail delivery, establish systems for delivering news and information, provide spare parts, and enhance living conditions with health and comfort items. Off-hand comments about these shortages, when broadcast/published in news media, focus undue attention on problems that we're working very hard to resolve. You should not muzzle your Marines, but they should be reminded that these discomforts and inconveniences, while sometimes foremost in their minds, play a backseat to the importance of accomplishing our mission, of doing what has to be done for as long as we have to be here.

The message seemed to have had some impact. Media accounts centering on such complaints were rare, and they were about the only negative reports about Marines throughout the deployment. When media did direct attention toward gripes, our commanders, to their credit, were more focused on resolving the source of the complaints than on lashing out at the media. There were a few commanders that reacted to negative comments in media reports by wanting to ban reporters from their ranks. But these were the exceptions. As the months wore on, a phenomenon developed none of us public affairs officers really expected. Some of our commanders actually began to enjoy having reporters around. In many cases they were the only Americans that our Marines and Sailors saw throughout the deployment. They brought news from home. Friendships and relationships developed between the journalists and the troops they covered. Perhaps more significantly, Marines grew accustomed to having journalists in their midst, and this paid dividends later on as we prepared to take the media through the breach.

Sensitivities and Propaganda

As DESERT SHIELD wore on, we became increasingly aware that Western media reports were being closely monitored in Jeddah, Baghdad, Amman, Tel Aviv, and, of course, Washington. On the one hand, our mandate for media access provided us with a means to tell Iraq and the rest of the world that we meant business and that we were capable of carrying through with the President's goals. We were showing that our weapons worked as advertised and our Marines were tough and unintimidated.

But a miscue with the press could turn into a propaganda coup for Iraq. For example, we steered reporters away from filming or photographing the practice of Christian or Jewish worship by U.S. military forces in Saudi Arabia. The Saudis granted us the privilege of observing our religious practices in their holy land so long as we didn't flaunt it. Had media routinely trained their cameras on our Marines bowing before a chaplain on the sacred Arabian sands, it would

have given Saddam fuel to ridicule the Keeper of the Two Holy Mosques in the eyes of the rest of the Arab world.

Disregard of other host nation sensitivities could cause similar repercussions in Arab eyes. We'd permitted media coverage of intramural touch football games at the King Abdul Aziz military facility soccer field with positive feedback. But when one of those games pitted the Wrecking Crew against the Desert Foxes, the CNN report, though a light-hearted account, created a public affairs nightmare. Those were all-women teams. The spectacle of females grappling in gym attire in a country that normally drapes its women in black from head to toe shocked and offended the Saudis. "Televising such matters on an international TV broadcast has negative results," advised the Saudi Eastern Area Commander in a letter to the Marine Central (MarCent) commander, "which might be utilized by the enemy to accompany opposing propaganda against the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia." There were, in fact, reports that Saddam had obtained a copy of the CNN segment and showed it repeatedly on Iraqi television to illustrate the decadent depths to which the guardians of Mecca had plummeted. About a month later the BBC reported an address by Saddam in which he belittled American forces by telling his troops that they would be fighting "women in shorts." We can only surmise as to the psychological impact of that statement on the morale of the Iraqi soldiers.

In spite of our best efforts to educate our troops, a minute percentage of our people failed to understand or appreciate Arab sensitivities. Unfortunately, some Americans chose to demonstrate their ignorance or intolerance around reporters, who sometimes printed their off-hand derogatory comments. A spate of such reports (based on remarks by U.S. troops) compelled LtGen Boomer to send another message to his commanders in early November 1990 emphasizing the importance of leadership in averting such comments:

. . . In the absence of significant developments in the deployment, news media will tend to report derogatory comments by individual U.S. Service members as indicators of negative trends that do not exist. Such reports mislead the American public, play into the hands of vocal opponents of U.S. foreign policy, and provide a source of potentially damaging propaganda for Iraq.

I want to encourage commanders to continue to host news media and allow their access to troops, and I do not wish to constrain the right of Marines and Sailors to speak their minds. However, if they choose the news media to air their gripes, it indicates to me that problems exist that are not being adequately addressed through the chain of command. Your Marines and Sailors are aware that this is not a perfect world, that this deployment will never feature all the comforts of home, that sacrifices will have to be made. They need to be aware that off-hand derogatory comments can impact U.S. public

opinion and degrade the degree of public support we currently enjoy. Your troops can, better than anyone, tell the Marine Corps story in DESERT SHIELD. I request that you simply share my concern with them. They will know what to do.

There were still occasional media reports based on petty grievances by Marines after that message was released, but for the most part they were overshadowed by unfolding events. As November passed, the Marine Corps birthday, exercise IMMINENT THUNDER, President Bush's visit and Thanksgiving observances all provided the media with plenty to report about.

Girding the Media for Combat

By January 1991 the press contingent at the Dhahran International Hotel numbered close to 1,000. All felt they were entitled to free access to the battlefield during combat operations. Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs, Pete Williams, in conjunction with public affairs officers from CENTCOM and the component commands, developed a system to limit media access to small groups of reporters who could share their stories, film, and videotape with other reporters. These pools would be positioned with forward-based ground units and remain with those units for the duration of the war.

The system was doomed for failure, at least in the minds of the media establishment, who complained loudly about being deprived of its First Amendment rights. They trotted out venerable Walter Cronkite, who testified before Congress that the military "has the responsibility of giving all the information it possibly can to the press, and the press has every right, to the point of insolence, to demand this."

That insolence created resentment among the American public who were aroused more by the arrogance of some correspondents than the substance of their reports. In a Times Mirror poll 78 percent of those surveyed believed the military was telling the public as much as it could under the circumstances and was not hiding the bad news. More than half even expressed a concern that the military wasn't exercising enough control over war reporting. In a Time/CNN poll nearly 80 percent of adults surveyed said they were getting enough information about the war, and almost 90 percent supported some censorship of the press under the circumstances.

"There's an irreconcilable conflict," said former television newsman Marvin Kalb in an article in Time magazine. He went on to add:

The press has not only a right but a responsibility to press for as much information as possible. And it is the government's responsibility to give only that information it feels will not be injurious to American troops on the line.

Safeguards and Ground Rules

In our view the pool system was the only practical way to preposition reporters with forward-based units as correspondents in the ground war without jeopardizing the success of the operation or endangering the lives of Marines and Sailors. The Pentagon developed ground rules as safeguards, using as a basis guidelines handed down to correspondents in conflicts going back to World War II. While reporters chaffed at these rules, they weren't much different than those with which their predecessors had to contend at Normandy and Iwo Jima. They were simply designed to prevent the enemy from learning in a news report our specific troop strengths and locations, our weaknesses, and our intentions.

Far more vexing to reporters than the ground rules, which governed the content of media dispatches, was the requirement that each press report undergo a security review at the source. The phrase, "cleared by Pentagon censors" began cropping up on DESERT STORM reports. One could almost envision a draconian group of officers in green eyeshades gleefully cutting and pasting the pool reports. The ersatz "censors"--staff noncommissioned officers and junior officers who served as pool escorts--were, in fact, very constrained in what they could recommend for removal from media reports.

The security review process prohibited any subsequent staffing of media materials through intermediate commands. If an escort officer couldn't convince a journalist that his story violated one of the ground rules, he had to "flag" the report, which would be jointly reviewed at the Dhahran JIB by military pool coordinators and media representatives. If they couldn't agree that the offending portions should be deleted, the report had to be forwarded to the Pentagon, where once again military officers and civilian journalists would try to strike some accord over the report's contents.

This tightly controlled appeal process protected the journalists from arbitrary deletion of information. But it also discouraged the escort officers from initiating confrontations over valid security concerns. The system helped avoid blatant opsec violations by individual reporters, but still allowed some information to be released that could be used by enemy intelligence who could compile the pool reports from across the front and study the cumulative information. In a letter in early February to the Dhahran JIB director, I complained that the process placed our escorts at an unfair disadvantage. As I noted in the letter;

. . . I support the concept of security at the source for pool reporting, but I don't think it's realistic to expect that all journalists will willingly omit portions of their reports solely in response to the persuasive powers of our escort officers. Some reporters simply can't grasp how the factual information they wish to include in their stories can be of value to the enemy and potentially endanger American lives. I believe that the JIB has been too liberal in allowing publication/broadcast of

reports flagged for possible ground rules violations. As a result, our pool journalists are getting bolder in incorporation of operational information in their reports, and our escort officers are increasingly reluctant to flag the material. I realize the JIB and the Pentagon are sensitive to charges of censorship. I think we're much better off erring on the side of censorship than gambling with operational security.

The problem with this approach was that far too few reports were being contested and "flagged" up to higher authorities. This was clearly evident during DESERT STORM when only five pool reports were submitted to the Pentagon for resolution, and just one of those was changed before being cleared for release.

K-Day to G-Day: Filtering the Pool

Just prior to K-day (what the locals called President Bush's 15 January ultimatum date), the Marines and the Army each received an 18-member media pool. We divided ours among the two divisions and the 1st Force Service Support Group/Direct Support Command.

Because air strikes dominated the early phases of DESERT STORM, special trips for "quick reaction pools" of six to seven journalists were set up through the 3d Marine Aircraft Wing Public Affairs Office to our air bases in Saudi Arabia and Bahrain. Meanwhile, those reporters attached to ground units filed reports on the preparation for the land attack, artillery raids, mine breaching exercises, and logistical buildup.

Post-war media reviews critical of the pool system have frequently cited the Khafji engagement as an example of failure to effectively employ pools to cover combat. This accusation is inexplicable since we were successful in taking our pools to Khafji on the first and subsequent days of the Iraqi incursion there. Among media that filed reports on the Khafji battle from the outset included NBC-TV, CBS Radio, the Washington Post, the London Telegraph, and United Press International. Photographers from Reuters, Time, and the Associated Press recorded the action visually with images that were widely used by news magazines and wire services. The critical reports may have stemmed from our initial restrictions in limiting media to the forward edge of Marine Corps positions outside the city, which at the time was defended by Arab coalition forces that did not want media in their sector. When our escorts were cleared to take reporters into the Saudi sector, they were turned away by Iraqi mortar fire.

By G-day (24 February) our pool with ground units had swelled to more than 30 members. All four major television networks, the three wire services, the major news magazines, and several leading newspapers were then represented in the Marine Corps pool. They were poised along the front with our task

forces, regimental combat teams, and forward command elements to cross the breach at first light as we attacked into Kuwait.

Media logistics

At that point, the biggest concern to I MEF's public affairs officers was delivering media pool products several hundred kilometers from the battlefield in Kuwait to the distribution point in Dhahran with the immediacy with which today's media are accustomed. We knew that dedicated helos would not be an option, at least initially, in the high-threat environment we faced during the early stages of the attack. Instead, we devised a system that exploited existing logistical channels to return the video, film, and print articles to the rear. We strategically placed about a dozen people as couriers at key points in the resupply chain. This allowed our couriers to piggyback aboard medevacs, fuel trucks, and ammo wagons returning from the battlefield to rear areas where other Marines were waiting to rush them by air or ground to Jubail or Dhahran.

Much of the time we were also able to exploit the MEF's electronic mail system. Print journalists composed their reports on their laptops and filed them on discs that we in turn loaded onto tactical computers that transmitted the documents via the electronic mail system's satellite link to terminals in the I MEF Rear headquarters at Jubail. They were then immediately faxed by the public affairs office there to Dhahran for dissemination to an eagerly awaiting mob of media.

Problems

Two days before the ground war was scheduled to commence, I asked the CentCom Public Affairs Office whether there would be any embargo of media pool products. "Do we want Saddam to find out about the assault over CNN?" I asked. I was also mindful that our media pool reports could easily upstage any official pronouncement concerning the ground war that might be made at the seat of government. I was told not to expect an embargo. Nevertheless, at about the time Marines were beginning to traverse the breach with media in tow, we received a flash message from the Pentagon directing us to hold all media products at forward staging areas. At about the same time, Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney announced a blackout on all war news. Although his announcement stated that all sensitive reports would be withheld from the public for at least 48 hours, the embargo was lifted later that day. But initial media reports were held up for several more hours while they were reviewed in Dhahran and Riyadh.

The pool reporters were enraged and their escorts exasperated by these delays, but they were short-lived. By the time most Americans were getting out of bed on 24 February, the pool reports were beginning to reach them through the media. There were other delays during the campaign, due in part to the rapid advancement of our divisions, which outran our system for returning the pool products.

Report Card

While the media panned the pool system in early reviews, it was generous in its acclaim for Marine public affairs officers. The reports coming out of our pools were so uniformly positive that some correspondents cooling their heels in Dhahran refused to use them. Some of our pool journalists were even accused by their colleagues of being coopted by the Marines.

Those Americans who pay attention to such details began to notice that Marines were getting a disproportionate share of the war's publicity. One reader of the New York Daily News even wrote a letter to the editor complaining about a pro-Marine Corps media bias. As his letter read,

Most of the war coverage centered around the actions of the Marines. They did no more or less than the Army to bring about the victorious conclusion of Operation DESERT STORM. President Harry Truman once said the U.S. Marines have the best public relations team and I think he was right.

Accolades for the public affairs officer notwithstanding, much of the credit for any success of the media coverage of Marines in the Gulf must go to individual unit commanders for their hospitality and candor in dealing with reporters and to young Marines in the desert, who never failed to impress journalists with their intelligence, toughness, and courage. But the Marine Corps' apparatus for accommodating reporters in combat or in any situation in which hostilities were imminent was archaic to nonexistent. Some examples:

Our system for transmitting print reports via electronic mail and fax was jerry-built at best. We need to institute a means for more rapid return of media pool products through satellite transmission. Delays in transmitting media pool products for technological reasons just reduce our opportunity to tell our story. As we found in Southwest Asia, media that aren't in pools won't wait long for these reports. They'll go off on their own with their own satellite dishes and report whatever they can find. If we can't afford the hardware, we should at least let the pools bring their own. But we lose a measure of security control if they use their own gear.

We need to ensure that our public affairs officers have the tactical transportation they require to move media and their products around the battlefield. Our media pool transportation problems in the Gulf were exacerbated by the vastness of our area of responsibility. In some cases we had to force the media to bring their own wheels. Their rented four wheel drive vehicles worked okay in the desert, but may not fare so well in other terrain or in areas where gasoline is not readily available.

We were never able to obtain secure communications support for our media escorts. Forcing them to transit the battlefield and rear areas, particularly at night, without secure radios is just plain foolish.

In most cases we should require that journalists bring their own commercially available 782 gear to enable them to live for extended periods of time in an expeditionary environment. At the same time, we need to be prepared to provide them adequate shelter and items such as nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) equipment that would not be practicable for them to purchase. Reporters don't usually expect VIP treatment, but as a matter of courtesy, they shouldn't be relegated to living conditions inferior to those of the Marines they're assigned to cover.

Throughout the Gulf War most pool reporters were under pressure, either actual or perceived, from their editors/producers to file stories every day, if not several times a day. We simply can't get them all to where the action is on a daily basis. At its best, the pool system was designed to have media prepositioned with commands that are expected to move forward during combat and remain with those units until hostilities break out. We should make every effort, as security and logistics permit, to get some reporters to any combat action or other newsworthy event as soon as possible. But they shouldn't expect us to shuttle them all over our area of responsibility every time there's some activity they want to report. Pool participants need to understand that movement among command sectors requires close coordination and careful control. We won't just pile them into a vehicle and haul them to every hot spot. To do so would be capricious and hazardous.

A reporter's rush to file can often lead to unbalanced, inaccurate reporting. The closer that correspondents get to the front, the narrower their perspective, both physically and psychologically. Reporters are likely, and understandably, going to make judgments about a battle in which they participate based on what they experience and observe, but their conclusions may not be an accurate assessment of the tactical situation. In their zeal to file a report about some exciting action to make deadline, they may not take the time to talk to a senior commander or staff officer who can place their observations into the overall context of the battle. These distorted reports, when placed into worldwide circulation, can play into the hands of enemy propagandists. In the Gulf War we were able to balance those reports by placing journalists with the command elements of the divisions and some of the regiments where they could be periodically briefed by commanders and senior operators on the bigger picture.

Our escort officers were frequently caught in the middle when pool members had conflicting needs. We tried to be sensitive to the diverse requirements among print and visual media and their various deadline constraints, but our escort officers shouldn't have to arbitrate among journalists when they don't agree. In future instances of prolonged media pool coverage of combat

operations, perhaps we should compel the journalists to elect their own team leaders to referee internal disputes.

Summarizing

Even with all these limitations and drawbacks, I believe the pool system is the only way military leaders can integrate the media into their operational units during combat. The alternative--letting a battalion's worth of media roam at will across the front--would be chaotic, counterproductive, and dangerous. While some media pundits may not agree, I think that the American public was well served by the reports that came from correspondents who lived with Marines in Saudi Arabia and advanced with them into Kuwait.

"Whatever else the press arrangements in the Persian Gulf may have been," wrote Pete Williams in the *Washington Post*,

they were a good-faith effort on the part of the military to be as fair as possible to the large number of reporters on the scene, to get as many reporters as possible out with troops during a highly mobile, modern ground war and to allow as much freedom in reporting as possible, while still preventing the enemy from knowing what we were up to.

The media, as a group, have whined a lot (with seemingly little sympathy from the American public) about their perceived lack of access to military operations in the Gulf War. Our experiences with journalists who spent time with Marines during DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM, however, were almost uniformly positive. Some lacked the military background we'd like to see in a war correspondent, but they were eager to learn. For the most part they treated our Marines, from the lowest-ranking grunts to the commanding generals, with respect. They put up with wretched field conditions during all extremes of weather and were willing to risk their lives in combat to get their stories. Particularly noteworthy for their insightful, sometimes compassionate accounts of Marines during the operation were Kirk Spitzer, Gannett Newspapers; Molly Moore, *Washington Post*; Colin Nickerson, *Boston Globe*; Otto Kreisher, Copley News Service; Bob Simon and Dan Rather, CBS News; Denis Gray, Associated Press; Ray Wilkinson, *Newsweek*; Marc Dulmage, CNN; Charles Platiau and Jeff Franks, Reuters; Jim Michaels, *San Diego Tribune*; and Linda Patillo, ABC-News. A tip of the Kevlar goes to these combat correspondents and many of their colleagues for their courage and professionalism.

Any impact of news media coverage on the outcome of military conflicts is a matter for conjecture. The U.S. troops in the Gulf enjoyed an unprecedented degree of public support, indeed, adoration for their service in DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM. Most correspondents who spent time with Marines in the operation filed glowing accounts. It isn't unreasonable to postulate that

this media coverage heightened public appreciation, which in turn became a force multiplier that kept spirits soaring and honed our determination to overwhelm the enemy and liberate Kuwait. In any case, our public affairs officers can take pride in the part they played in engineering the words and images that were effective weapons against the enemy's lies and hypocrisy; words and images that added some thunder and lightning to what our actual weaponry had already started during DESERT STORM.

Marine Corps Forces in the Persian Gulf Region, February 1991

(As shown in the Operations Summary prepared by Current Operations Branch, HQMC, for February 1991)

I Marine Expeditionary Force

Commanding General

LtGen Walter E. Boomer

Command Element

Headquarters & Service Company, I MEF (-) (Reinforced)
1st Surveillance, Reconnaissance, and Intelligence Group (-) (Reinforced)
1st Radio Battalion (-) (Reinforced)
3d Civil Affairs Group (Reinforced), U.S. Army
403d Civil Affairs Co, U.S. Army (Operational Control)
3d Naval Construction Regiment
Naval Mobile Construction Battalion 24
Naval Mobile Construction Battalion 5
Naval Mobile Construction Battalion 74
Naval Mobile Construction Battalion 40

Ground Combat Element

1st Marine Division (-) (Reinforced)

Commanding General

MajGen James M. Myatt

Headquarters Battalion (-)
1st Marines (-) (Reinforced) (Task Force Papa Bear)
1st Battalion, 1st Marines
3d Battalion, 9th Marines
1st Tank Battalion
Company B, 3d Assault Amphibian Battalion
Company C, 3d Assault Amphibian Battalion
3d Marines (-) (Reinforced) (Task Force Taro)
1st Battalion, 3d Marines
2d Battalion, 3d Marines
3d Battalion, 3d Marines
4th Marines (-) (Reinforced) (Task Force Grizzly)
2d Battalion, 7th Marines
3d Battalion, 7th Marines
7th Marines (-) (Reinforced) (Task Force Ripper)
1st Battalion, 7th Marines

1st Battalion, 5th Marines
 1st Combat Engineer Battalion
 3d Tank Battalion
 11th Marines (-) (Reinforced)
 1st Battalion, 11th Marines
 3d Battalion, 11th Marines
 5th Battalion, 11th Marines
 1st Battalion, 12th Marines
 3d Battalion, 12th Marines
 1st Light Armored Infantry Battalion (-) (Reinforced) (Task Force Shepherd)
 3d Assault Amphibian Battalion (-) (Reinforced)
 1st Reconnaissance Battalion (-) (Reinforced)

2d Marine Division (-) (Reinforced)

Commanding General

MajGen William M. Keys

Headquarters Battalion (-) (Reinforced)
 6th Marines (-) (Reinforced)
 1st Battalion, 6th Marines
 3d Battalion, 6th Marines
 1st Battalion, 8th Marines
 2d Battalion, 2d Marines
 Task Force Breach Alpha
 8th Marines (-) (Reinforced)
 2d Battalion, 4th Marines
 3d Battalion, 23d Marines
 Task Force Breach Bravo
 Company B, 4th Assault Amphibian Battalion
 Company F, 2d Light Armored Infantry Battalion
 10th Marines (-) (Reinforced)
 2d Battalion, 10th Marines
 3d Battalion, 10th Marines
 5th Battalion, 10th Marines
 2d Battalion, 12th Marines
 2d Light Armored Infantry Battalion (-) (Reinforced)
 2d Tank Battalion (-) (Reinforced)
 8th Tank Battalion (-) (Reinforced)
 2d Assault Amphibian Battalion (-) (Reinforced)
 2d Combat Engineer Battalion (-) (Reinforced)
 2d Reconnaissance Battalion (-) (Reinforced)
 1st Brigade, 2d Armored Division (Tiger Brigade), U.S. Army
 1st Battalion, 67th Armor Regiment
 3d Battalion, 67th Armor Regiment
 3d Battalion, 41st Mechanized Infantry Regiment
 1st Battalion, 3d Field Artillery Regiment
 Air Defence Artillery Platoon
Combat Service Support Element
 502d Forward Support Battalion
 one company, 1st Battalion, 17th Engineers

one platoon, 1st Battalion, 502d Military Police Regiment
 Signal Platoon
 Chemical Platoon

Air Combat Element

3d Marine Aircraft Wing

Commanding General

MajGen Royal N. Moore Jr.

Marine Wing Headquarters Squadron 3 (MWHS-3) (-)

Marine Aircraft Group 11

Marine Aviation Logistics Squadron 11 (MALS-11) (Forward)

Marine All Weather Fighter Attack Squadron 121 (VMFA (AW)-121)

Marine Fighter Attack Squadron 212 (VMFA-212)

Marine Fighter Attack Squadron 232 (VMFA-232)

Marine Fighter Attack Squadron 235 (VMFA-235)

Marine Fighter Attack Squadron 314 (VMFA-314)

Marine Fighter Attack Squadron 333 (VMFA-333)

Marine Fighter Attack Squadron 451 (VMFA-451)

Marine All Weather Attack Squadron 224 (VMA(AW)-224)

Marine All Weather Attack Squadron 533 (VMA(AW)-533)

Marine Tactical Electronic Warfare Squadron 2 (VMAQ-2)

Marine Aerial Refueler Transport Squadron 252 (VMGR-252) (-)

Marine Aerial Refueler Transport Squadron 352 (VMGR-352) (-)

Detachment, Marine Aerial Refueler Transport Squadron 452 (VMGR-452)

Marine Aircraft Group 13

Marine Aviation Logistics Squadron 13 (MALS-13) (Forward)

Marine Attack Squadron 231 (VMA-231)

Marine Attack Squadron 311 (VMA-311)

Marine Attack Squadron 542 (VMA-542)

Detachment B, Marine Attack Squadron 513 (VMA-513)

Marine Observation Squadron 1 (VMO-1)

Marine Observation Squadron 2 (VMO-2) (-)

Marine Aircraft Group 16

Marine Aviation Logistics Squadron 16 (MALS-16) (Forward)

Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron 161 (HMM-161)

Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron 165 (HMM-165)

Marine Light Attack Helicopter Squadron 367 (HMLA-367)

Marine Light Attack Helicopter Squadron 369 (HMLA-369)

Marine Heavy Helicopter Squadron 462 (HMH-462)

Marine Heavy Helicopter Squadron 463 (HMH-463)

Marine Heavy Helicopter Squadron 465 (HMH-465)

Marine Heavy Helicopter Squadron 466 (HMH-466) (-)

Marine Aircraft Group 26

Marine Aviation Logistics Squadron 26 (MALS-26) (Forward)

Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron 261 (HMM-261)

Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron 266 (HMM-266)

Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron 774 (HMM-774)

Marine Heavy Helicopter Squadron 464 (HMH-464) (-)

Marine Heavy Helicopter Squadron 362 (HMH-362)
 Detachment A, Marine Heavy Helicopter Squadron 772 (HMH-772)
 Marine Attack Helicopter Squadron 775 (HMA-775)
 Marine Light Helicopter Squadron 767 (HML-767)
 Marine Air Control Group 38
 Headquarters & Headquarters Squadron 38 (H&HS-38)
 Marine Air Control Squadron 2 (MACS-2)
 Marine Air Traffic Control Squadron 38 (MATCS-38) (-)
 Marine Air Support Squadron 3 (MASS-3)
 Marine Wing Communications Squadron 38 (MWCS-38) (-)
 2d Light Antiaircraft Missile Battalion
 3d Light Antiaircraft Missile Battalion
 2d Low Altitude Air Defence Battalion (-)
 3d Low Altitude Air Defence Battalion (-)
 Marine Wing Support Group 37
 Headquarters & Headquarters Squadron 37 (H&HS-37)
 Marine Wing Support Squadron 174 (MWSS-174)
 Marine Wing Support Squadron 271 (MWSS-271)
 Marine Wing Support Squadron 273 (MWSS-273)
 Marine Wing Support Squadron 373 (MWSS-373)
 Marine Wing Support Squadron 374 (MWSS-374)

Combat Service Support Element

1st Force Service Support Group (-) (Reinforced)

Commanding General

BGen James A. Brabham Jr.

Headquarters and Service Battalion (-)
 General Support Group 1
 Combat Service Support Detachment 131
 Combat Service Support Detachment 132
 2d Supply Battalion (-) (Reinforced)
 2d Maintenance Battalion (-) (Reinforced)
 6th Motor Transport Battalion (-) (Reinforced)
 1st Landing Support Battalion (-) (Reinforced)
 1st Dental Battalion
 General Support Group 2
 7th Motor Transport Battalion (-) (Reinforced)
 2d Landing Support Battalion (-)
 1st Medical Battalion (-)
 Combat Service Support Detachment 91 (Enemy Prisoners of War)

DIRECT SUPPORT COMMAND

Commanding General

BGen Charles C. Krulak

Headquarters and Service Battalion (-), 2d FSSG
 7th Engineer Support Battalion (-) (Reinforced)

8th Engineer Support Battalion (-) (Reinforced)
 8th Motor Transport Battalion (-) (Reinforced)
 2d Medical Battalion (-) (Reinforced)
 2d Dental Battalion (-)
 Direct Support Group 1
 Combat Service Support Detachment 10
 Mobile Combat Service Support Detachment 11 (Regimental Combat Team-1)
 Mobile Combat Service Support Detachment 17 (Regimental Combat Team-7)
 Direct Support Group 2
 Mobile Combat Service Support Detachment 26
 Mobile Combat Service Support Detachment 28
 Rear Area Security
 24th Marines (-)
 2d Battalion, 24th Marines
 3d Battalion, 24th Marines

Marine Forces Afloat

4th Marine Expeditionary Brigade

Commanding General

MajGen Harry W. Jenkins Jr.

Command Element

Headquarters and Service Co, 4th MEB

Ground Combat Element

Regimental Landing Team 2
 Headquarters Company, 2d Marines
 1st Battalion, 2d Marines
 3d Battalion, 2d Marines
 1st Battalion, 10th Marines
 2d Light Armored Infantry Battalion (-)
 Company A, 2d Assault Amphibian Battalion
 Company A, 2d Tank Battalion
 Company A (-), 2d Reconnaissance Battalion
 Detachment, Truck Company, Headquarters Battalion, 2d Marine Division

Air Combat Element

Marine Aircraft Group 40
 Marine Attack Squadron 331 (VMA-331)
 Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron 263 (HMM-263)
 Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron 365 (HMM-365)
 Marine Heavy Helicopter Squadron 461 (HMH-461)
 Marine Light Attack Helicopter Squadron 299 (HMLA-269) (-)
 Marine Aviation Logistics Squadron 14 (MALS-14)
 Headquarters and Headquarters Squadron 28 (H&HS-28) (-)

Marine Air Control Squadron 6 (MACS-6) (-)
Marine Wing Communications Squadron 28 (MWCS-28) (-)
Detachment B, Marine Air Support Squadron 1 (MASS-1)
A Battery, 2d Low Altitude Air Defense Battalion
Marine Wing Support Squadron 274 (MWSS-274)

Combat Service Support Element

Brigade Service Support Element 4

5th Marine Expeditionary Brigade

Commanding General

BGen Peter J. Rowe

Command Element

Headquarters and Service Company, 5th MEB
Surveillance, Reconnaissance, and Intelligence Support Group 5

Ground Combat Element

Regimental Landing Team 5
Headquarters Company, 5th Marines
2d Battalion, 5th Marines
3d Battalion, 5th Marines
3d Battalion, 1st Marines
2d Battalion, 11th Marines (-) (Reinforced)
Company D, 1st Light Armored Infantry Battalion
Company B, 1st Combat Engineer Battalion (Reinforced)
Company A, 4th Tank Battalion (Reinforced)
Antitank Platoon, 23d Marines
Company A, 4th Assault Amphibian Battalion (Reinforced)
Company B, 1st Reconnaissance Battalion (Reinforced)

Air Combat Element

Marine Aircraft Group 50
Headquarters, Marine Aircraft Group 50
Detachment, Marine Air Control Group 38 (MACG-38)
Detachment, Marine Air Control Squadron 7 (MACS-7)
Detachment C, Marine Air Support Squadron 6 (MASS-6) (Direct Air Support Center)
A Battery, 3d Low Altitude Air Defense Battalion (-) (Reinforced)
Detachment, Marine Aviation Logistics Squadron 16 (MALS-16)
Detachment, Marine Aviation Logistics Squadron 39 (MALS-39)
Detachment, Marine Aviation Logistics Squadron 13 (MALS-13)
Detachment, Marine Aviation Logistics Squadron 24 (MALS-24)
Detachment, Marine Wing Headquarters Squadron 3 (MWHHS-3)
Detachment, Marine Wing Weapons Unit 3 (MWWU-3)

Detachment, Marine Wing Support Squadron (MWSS) (rotary wing)
Detachment, Marine Wing Support Squadron (MWSS) (fixed wing)
Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron 268 (HMM-268)
Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron 265 (HMM-265)
Detachment, Marine Heavy Helicopter Squadron 466 (HMH-466)
Marine Light Attack Helicopter Squadron 169 (HMLA-169) (-)
Marine Attack Helicopter Squadron 773 (HMA-773)

Combat Service Support Element

Brigade Service Support Group 5
Detachment, Headquarters & Service Battalion, 1st FSSG
Detachment, 1st Landing Support Battalion (Reinforced)
Detachment, Communications Company
Detachment, 7th Motor Transport Battalion
Detachment, Medical Battalion (includes dental detachment)
Detachment, 7th Engineer Support Battalion
Detachment, 1st Supply Battalion
Detachment, 1st Maintenance Battalion

13th Marine Expeditionary Unit (Special Operations Capable)

Commanding Officer Col John E. Rhodes
Battalion Landing Team 1/4
Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron 164 (HMM-164) (Reinforced)
MEU Service Support Group 13

Persian Gulf War Chronology

August 1990 - June 1991

1990

7 August--President Bush ordered U.S. military aircraft and troops to Saudi Arabia as part of a multinational force to defend that country against possible Iraqi invasion. The Persian Gulf crisis was triggered on 2 August when Iraqi President Saddam Hussein invaded neighboring Kuwait with overwhelming forces and subsequently positioned assault elements on the Saudi-Kuwait border. On 6 August, the United Nations Security Council approved a total trade ban against Iraq. A major deployment, the largest since the Vietnam War, was started for Operation Desert Shield that included major units from all four services.

8 August--Major General Walter E. Boomer was promoted to the grade of lieutenant general and assigned as Commanding General of I Marine Expeditionary Force.

15 August--Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps announced the commitment of 45,000 troops to the Persian Gulf area. This deployment consisted of elements of the I Marine Expeditionary Force including units from 1st Marine Division and 1st Force Service Support Group (FSSG), 3d Marine Aircraft Wing (MAW), and 7th Marine Expeditionary Brigade (MEB). Also en route were elements of the 4th MEB including units from 2d Marine Division, 2d FSSG, and 2d MAW. On arrival in Saudi Arabia, the 7th MEB linked up with Maritime Pre-Positioning Ship Squadron 2 (MPS-2), dispatched from its normal anchorage at Diego Garcia in the Indian Ocean. The five-ship squadron contained 7th MEB's equipment and enough supplies to sustain the 16,500-person force for 30 days.

22 August--President Bush ordered the first mobilization of U.S. military reserves in 20 years and declared the call-up "essential to completing our mission" of thwarting Iraqi aggression in the Persian Gulf. Most of those summoned to active duty in the initial mobilization were Army reservists.

24 August--The U.S. Embassy in Kuwait was ordered closed. Marine security guards were with the approximately 100 U.S. officials and citizens transferred to the U.S. Embassy in Baghdad by the Iraqi government. They were among an estimated 1,000 Americans being held hostage in Iraq.

11 September--President Bush spoke to a joint session of Congress and adamantly set forth the U.S. objectives in the Persian Gulf: Iraq must withdraw from Kuwait completely, Kuwait's legitimate government must be restored, the security and stability of the Persian Gulf must be assured, and American citizens must be protected. The remarkable buildup of U.S. and allied military forces in Saudi Arabia and the Persian Gulf area and the blockade of Iraq continued at full pace amid renewed statements of determination on both sides.

26 September--General Alfred M. Gray, Commandant of the Marine Corps, addressed a detachment of Marines in Saudi Arabia while touring Marine positions there and meeting with officials from Persian Gulf nations. He talked about a variety of topics ranging from relations with Arab countries to unit rotations, and challenged Marines to continue to do their jobs in the best way they know how. It was the first visit to Southwest Asia during Operation Desert Shield for the Commandant who was accompanied by Sergeant Major of the Marine Corps David W. Sommers.

8 October--The first fatal Marine accident in Operation Desert Shield claimed the lives of eight men when two UH-1N Huey helicopters crashed into the North Arabian Sea during a night training mission. The Marines were assigned to Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron 164 for deployment.

10 October--The first unit-sized activation of Marine reservists came when Marines from Combat Service Support Detachment 40 reported to Marine Corps Air Station, Kaneohe, Hawaii. The mission of the unit was to maintain and refurbish equipment left behind by 1st Marine Expeditionary Brigade as it deployed to Saudi Arabia to marry up with its pre-positioned equipment aboard Maritime Prepositioning Ship 3.

8 November--President Bush announced that he planned to add more than 200,000 U.S. troops to those already deployed in Operation Desert Shield in the Persian Gulf area. When completed, this deployment doubled the number of Marines in the objective area, adding II Marine Expeditionary Force units from the Corps' east coast bases and the 5th Marine Expeditionary Brigade from California.

13 November--A second involuntary call-up of selected Marine Corps Reserve units began. Marines from 20 units of the 4th Marine Division and the 4th Marine Aircraft Wing reported to the 5th Marine Expeditionary Brigade at Camp Pendleton, California, for redeployment training.

14 November--Defense Secretary Richard Cheney authorized the call-up of 72,500 more National Guard and Reserve troops in support of Operation Desert Shield. Added to authority already granted, the action raised the number of Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps selected reservists who could be on

active duty at the same time to 125,000. The call-up ceiling for the Marine Corps was 15,000.

15-21 November--About 100 miles south of the Kuwait border, American and Saudi Arabian military forces participated in Exercise Imminent Thunder. The exercise included an amphibious landing by more than 1,000 Marines of the 4th Marine Expeditionary Brigade and tested the military's ability to command, control, and coordinate air and ground forces. It included air-to-air mock fighter combat and close air support of ground forces. At the same time, only 25 miles south of Kuwait, another 1,000 Marines from the 1st Marine Expeditionary Brigade conducted field exercises ashore.

16 November--Admiral Frank B. Kelso II, Chief of Naval Operations, announced that ships would remain in the Middle East longer than the six-month limit established for Navy deployments. The decision of November 8th to send nearly 200,000 more troops to the Persian Gulf not only scuttled Defense Department plans to start rotating personnel home from the desert, but also bumped the subject of troop rotation off the Pentagon's list of priorities.

22 November--President Bush addressed U.S. Marines, sailors, and British soldiers during his visit to Saudi Arabia. Standing before a crowd of more than 3,000 front-line forces, the president reaffirmed his resolve to see Iraqi strongman Saddam Hussein ousted from Kuwait. The President and Mrs. Bush then joined the Marines for a traditional Thanksgiving Day meal.

3 December--The Marine Corps was granted a new call-up ceiling of 23,000 reservists when Defense Secretary Richard Cheney gave the military departments authority to call-up 63,000 additional members of the National Guard and Reserves in support of Operation Desert Shield. Added to authority already granted, this action raised the number of Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps selected reservists who could be on active duty at the same time to 188,000.

10 December--More than 24,000 Marines of the II Marine Expeditionary Force mustered on the parade ground at Camp Lejeune, North Carolina, for a pre-deployment review by the Commandant of the Marine Corps and the Commander in Chief, Atlantic Fleet in the largest formation of Marines in modern history. Commanded by Lieutenant General Carl E. Mundy, Jr., the units included the 2d Marine Division, 2d Marine Aircraft Wing, 2d Force Service Support Group, and the 2d Surveillance Reconnaissance and Intelligence Group. The units deployed to Southwest Asia in support of Operation Desert Shield through the month of December.

18 December--Rollout ceremonies for the Corps' new M1A1 tank were held at the General Dynamics Land Systems Division in Warren, Michigan. The M1A1 "common tank" was outfitted to Marine Corps specifications with such features

as ship tiedowns, a deep water fording capability, and position locating and reporting system capability. The tank replaced the aging M60A1. The 2d Tank Battalion based at Camp Lejeune, North Carolina, used the new tank in the Persian Gulf while other tank battalions operated M60A1s.

22 December--Secretary of Defense Richard B. Cheney visited the 1st Marine Division combat operations center in Saudi Arabia. He and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Colin L. Powell, were on a five-day trip to the Middle East where they met with deployed commanders, sailors, soldiers, airmen and Marines aboard ship and in the sands of Saudi Arabia. They expressed their support for the 300,000 men and women serving in the Persian Gulf area.

27 December--Company A from Marine Barracks, Washington, D.C., the oldest post of the Marine Corps, departed for Camp Lejeune, North Carolina, to join elements of the 2d Marine Division deploying for Operation Desert Shield. Marines from the barracks were last deployed in 1906 when a detachment was assigned to the expeditionary battalions sent to Cuba for pacification duty.

1991

1 January--The strength of active duty U.S. Armed Forces was 2,340,354 of which 197,764 were Marines. By mid-month, almost half of the Corps' active duty strength in the Persian Gulf area.

12 January--After three days of solemn, often eloquent debate, Congress voted President Bush the authority to go to war against Iraq. The Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Iraq Resolution allowed the U.S. to use all necessary means against Iraq if it did not withdraw from Kuwait by midnight, January 15th. It was the first time since August 7, 1964, when the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution was adopted, that Congress had voted directly for offensive military action.

15 January--The V Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) was activated to assume missions and tasks assigned to I MEF prior to its deployment to Southwest Asia. V MEF was to form, train, and deploy units to reinforce and replace those employed in the Persian Gulf area.

16 January--Operation Desert Shield became Operation Desert Storm as forces of the allied coalition launched an all-out air assault against targets in Iraq and occupied Kuwait in an effort to liberate Kuwait and enforce the resolutions of the United Nations Security Council. Overall, in the theater of operation there were more than 415,000 U.S. troops and over 265,000 allied troops in the coalition.

21 January--Baghdad aired footage of captured allied airmen that included five Americans, two Britons, an Italian, and a Kuwaiti who appeared in their uniforms and spoke stiffly. Several of the prisoners had swollen, bruised faces. Marine prisoners were identified as Lieutenant Colonel Clifford M. Acree and Chief Warrant Officer Guy L. Hunter. Their OV-10 Bronco was shot down over southern Kuwait on 18 January.

29 January--The first serious ground fighting of Operation Desert Storm broke out when Iraqi troops mounted an attack into Saudi Arabia along a 40-mile front. Company and battalion-sized Iraqi units centered their efforts on Khafji, a deserted port city, six miles south of the border. Saudi and Qatari troops, supported by artillery and attack helicopters from the 1st Marine Division and aircraft from the anti-Iraq coalition, recaptured the town two days later. The fighting produced the first ground casualties of the war; 11 Marines were killed when their light armored vehicles were destroyed in a clash with Iraqi armored forces.

5 February--The Secretary of the Navy authorized the involuntary recall of up to 2,000 retired Marines who had completed at least 20 years of active duty and who were under the age of 60. According to ALMAR 33/91, the retirees were to be retained on active duty for as long as deemed necessary.

13 February--As of this date, the allied air forces had flown more than 65,000 sorties in Iraq and Kuwait, with a total of 28 planes lost in combat--19 from the United States and nine from allied forces. Of the 19 U.S. planes, four were Marine Corps aircraft--three AV-8B Harriers and 1 OV-10 Bronco. Marine artillery units, using 155mm towed and 8-inch self-propelled howitzers staged a series of nighttime artillery raids over the heavily defended border of Kuwait.

13, 16 February--The Marine Corps ordered an additional 1,758 Selected Marine Corps Reservists to active duty on these dates. The total number of Selected Marine Corps Reserves called up during Operations Desert Storm and Desert Shield was brought up to 24,703. With the advent of war in the Persian Gulf, President Bush authorized the Secretary of Defense to expand the callup of Marine reservists to include the Individual Ready Reserve. At the same time, the Marine Corps Reserve mobilization ceiling of 23,000 was hiked to 44,000.

14 February--As of this date, the active duty end strength of the Marine Corps was 200,248 including reservists on active duty. It was the first time active duty end strength exceeded 200,000 since fiscal year 1971.

15 February--Captain Jonathan R. Edwards of Grand Rapids, Michigan, was the first Marine casualty of the Persian Gulf war to be buried at Arlington National Cemetery. He was killed on 2 February when the AH-1 Cobra helicopter he was flying crashed in the desert. Major Eugene McCarthy of Brooklyn, New York, also died in the crash.

15 February--Allied commanders estimated that 30 percent of Iraq's armor, 35 percent of its artillery, and 27 percent of its other armored vehicles in the Kuwaiti theater of operations had been destroyed by this date.

24 February--The I Marine Expeditionary Force and coalition forces began a ground assault on Iraqi defenses in the final chapter of Operation Desert Storm. Located just south of the Kuwaiti border along the Persian Gulf, the 2d Marine Division and the 1st Marine Division with its four main task forces--Ripper, Papa Bear, Taro, and Grizzly--stormed into the teeth of Iraqi defenses and convinced the defenders that it was the main effort of attack. Meanwhile, heavily armored allied forces attacked the Iraqi defenses in Iraq from behind. At the same time, Marine units of the 4th and 5th Marine Expeditionary Brigades afloat in the Persian Gulf pinned down large numbers of Iraqi troops who expected an amphibious assault. In 100 hours, U.S. and allied forces defeated the Iraqi Army.

28 February--Operation Desert Storm ended when the cease-fire declared by President George Bush went into effect. I Marine Expeditionary Force had a strength of 92,990 making Operation Desert Storm the largest Marine Corps operation in history. A total of 23 Marines were killed in action or later died of wounds from the time the air war was launched on January 16th until the cease-fire took effect 43 days later.

10 March--Five Marine prisoners of war were among the 21 POWs who arrived at Andrews Air Force Base, Washington, D.C. The Marine POWs were freed on March 5th and were transported from Iraq by an International Red Cross aircraft. They were: Lieutenant Colonel Clifford M. Acree, Major Joseph J. Small III, Captain Michael C. Berryman, Captain Russell A.C. Sanborn, and Warrant Officer Guy L. Hunter. The POWs were met by Secretary of Defense Richard Cheney and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Colin Powell. Also greeted by their families and thousands of other well-wishers, the POWs were then taken to the National Naval Medical Center, Bethesda, Maryland.

12 March--President Bush signed an executive order establishing a Southwest Asia Service Medal for members of the U.S. Armed Forces who participated in Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm. The medal, designed by the Institute of Heraldry, depicted a desert and sea landscape on the front side with tanks, armored personnel carriers, helicopters, ships, and fixed-wing aircraft. It was suspended from a sand-colored ribbon incorporating the colors of the United States and Kuwaiti flags: red, white, blue, green, and black.

14 March--Euphoria in Kuwait rose with the return of the newly-liberated country's emir, Sheikh Jaber Ahmad Al-Sabah, after a seven-month exile. The emir's return brought hopes for democracy from the Kuwaiti people who endured Iraqi occupation.

14 March--Five Marines and two Navy prisoners of war, who returned to the U.S. four days earlier, participated in a press conference at the Bethesda Naval Hospital. Appearing sharp and confident, they fielded numerous questions from the press on the details of their capture and experiences as prisoners.

16 March--The Commandant of the Marine Corps, General Alfred M. Gray, presented the Prisoner of War Medal to the five Marine POWs from the Persian Gulf. The ceremony took place at the Bethesda Naval Hospital.

6 April--President George Bush signed into law a Persian Gulf personnel benefits bill that increased imminent-danger pay, family separation allowance, group life insurance coverage, education assistance, child care, and family education and support services. The Persian Gulf Conflict Supplemental Authorization and Personnel Benefits Act of 1991 authorized \$15 billion for Persian Gulf operations, \$400 million for benefits for service members, and \$225 million for veterans' assistance.

15-18 April--Thousands of sailors and Marines were welcomed home by cheering crowds as they returned to their homeports from deployment to the Persian Gulf. Included were more than 7,500 Marines of the 4th Marine Expeditionary Brigade who arrived at Morehead City, North Carolina, and Marines of the 13th Marine Expeditionary Unit who arrived at Camp Pendleton, California.

24 April--Five Marines who performed heroic acts in the Persian Gulf received Silver Star medals in ceremonies held at Camp Pendleton, California. Lieutenant General Walter E. Boomer, Commanding General of the I Marine Expeditionary Force, presented the medals to: Staff Sergeant Daniel A. Kur, Sergeant Gordon T. Gregory, and Corporals Bryan R. Freeman, Michael S. Kilpatrick, and Bryan K. Zickefoose.

24 April--The I Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) was welcomed home from Operation Desert Storm during ceremonies at Camp Pendleton, California. At the same time V MEF, activated in January to assume the missions and tasks assigned to the deployed I MEF, deactivated.

8 June--Operation Welcome Home paid tribute to every service member who went to Southwest Asia in support of Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm. Some 1,800 Marines with 14 pieces of major equipment and 19 aircraft participated in the Desert Storm National Victory Parade in Washington, D.C. that was led by General H. Norman Schwarzkopf, Commander of the U.S. Central Command and Desert Storm forces. Marines from the I Marine Expeditionary Force and all its major subordinate commands marched in the parade reviewed by the Commander in Chief, President George Bush. In addition to the parade, Marines manned over 30 pieces of equipment on display

for public viewing on the Mall in Washington. Two days later, over 1,700 Marines including about 650 reservists, marched down Broadway in New York City's ticker-tape parade.

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upon their own experiences with the aircraft while serving with Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron 464.

LtGen Royal N. Moore, Jr., USMC. "Marine Air: There When Needed." *U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings*, Nov91, pp. 63-70.

LtGen Moore commanded the air combat element of I MEF during Desert Shield/Desert Storm, the 3d Marine Aircraft Wing. In this interview, he reviews the successful performance of Marine air units in Operation Desert Storm. He also reviews the coordination of these air units with those of the Navy and the Air Force.

MajGen J. M. Myatt, USMC. "The 1st Marine Division in the Attack." *U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings*, Nov91, pp. 71-76.

An interview with General Myatt, the commanding officer of the 1st Marine Division, in which he describes the deployment, training, and readiness of his division in Saudi Arabia, and also reviews the tank battle in which the 1st Division captured the airfield outside of Kuwait City.

Cdr W. H. Nelson, USN. "What's the Answer for the Gulf?" *U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings*, Dec90, pp. 32-37.

A maritime strategist with experience in the Chief of Naval Operations Office of Strategic Concepts (OP-603) and at the Naval War College examines the geopolitical situation in the Persian Gulf region and its implications for United States policy. Cdr Nelson argues that American interests can be best served by a strong maritime presence, including substantial Marine Corps forces.

Capt Douglas M. Norton, USN. "Sealift: Keystone of Support." *U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings*, May91, pp. 42-49.

A narrative description of the efforts of the Military Sealift Command and the Strategic Sealift Force to deploy equipment and forces to the Persian Gulf during Operation Desert Shield. Capt Norton argues that the United States needs to improve its strategic sealift capability, particularly the Ready Reserve Force and the U.S. Merchant Marine.

1stLt John F. O'Connor, USMC. "Current Staffing Policies Need Review." *Marine Corps Gazette*, Nov91, pp. 54-55.

1stLt O'Connor examines the use of augmentees to fill gaps in the T/O of deploying units, based on his experience with Marine Wing Support Squadron 372 during the Persian Gulf War.

LtCol John A. O'Donovan, USMC. "Combat Service Support During Desert Shield and Desert Storm: From Kibrit to Kuwait." *Marine Corps Gazette*, Oct91, pp. 26-31.

The author describes the task organization of combat service support elements within the Marine expeditionary force and brigades during Operation Desert Shield, and their employment in support of combat operations, focusing on the experience of the 2d Force Service Support Group.

Col Jeremiah O'Leary, USMC (Ret). "Desert Memories Etched in Sand." *Marine Corps Gazette*, Nov90, pp. 42-43.

The author presents several lessons regarding warfare in desert conditions learned during Marine Corps training exercises in the Mojave Desert in Twentynine Palms, California and Saudi Arabia in 1973, many of which were not applied during Desert Shield.

Capt R. A. Padilla, USMC. "F/A-18Ds Go To War." *U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings*, Aug91, pp. 40.

Capt Padilla, a member of Marine All Weather Fighter Attack Squadron 121, describes how the new F/A-18D aircraft was incorporated into the squadron's training exercises before deployment to the Gulf region. He also reviews the squadron's use of the F/A-18D in battlefield preparation and ground support in Operation Desert Storm.

Michael A. Palmer. "The Navy Did Its Job." *U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings*, May 1991, pp. 88-93.

The author outlines the Navy's participation in Operation Desert Storm, and reviews the vital roles played by the Navy in both the air and ground campaigns, through seabased air power, combat support, and amphibious operations.

LtCol T. W. Parker, USMC. "Operation Sharp Edge." *U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings*, May 1991, pp. 103-106.

The executive officer of the 22d Marine Expeditionary Unit (Special Operations Capable) reviews the unit's participation, along with other Marine and naval forces, in Operation Sharp Edge to protect American citizens and interests in Liberia during a civil war. He reviews his unit's performance and suggests some lessons to be learned from the experience.

Col W. Hays Parks, USMCR. "Rules of Engagement: No More Vietnams." *U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings*, Mar91, pp. 27-28.

The author contrasts the 1965-68 Rolling Thunder bombing campaign in North Vietnam to the planning and management of the air campaign at the beginning of Desert Storm. He concludes that the only real similarity between the American situation in Vietnam and recent situations in the Gulf War was enemy treatment of United States and allied prisoners of war.

Capt J.H. Patton, Jr., USN (Ret). "More Gulf War Lessons." *U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings*, Apr91, pp. 52.

Captain Patton presents several more lessons to be learned from the experience of U.S. forces in the Persian Gulf War. A major lesson is the importance of stealth technology, as shown by the success of stealth weapons in Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm. He also relates weapons systems to their costs, and examines the similarities between desert warfare and naval warfare.

LCdr Michael N. Pocalyko, USN. "Desert Shield: The First Lessons Learned." *U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings*, Oct90, pp. 58-59.

A political-military analyst in the Secretary of the Navy's Office of Program Appraisal presents nine key principals of national military strategy highlighted by the early phases of Operation Desert Shield.

Col Alfred J. Ponnwitz, USMC. "Survivability and Southwest Asia." *Marine Corps Gazette*, Aug91, pp. 36-37.

The author examines the problem of battlefield survivability, as defined in his August 1989 *Marine Corps Gazette* article, "Understanding Survivability." Col Ponnwitz concludes that despite the impressive successes of Operation Desert Shield, the Marine Corps must continue to strive to improve battlefield survivability.

Col John R. Pope, USMC. "U.S. Marines in Operation Desert Storm." *Marine Corps Gazette*, Jul91, pp. 63-69.

The author summarizes Marine Corps participation in both the air and the ground campaigns during Operation Desert Storm, from the initial reconnaissance and repositioning of forces to the liberation of Kuwait.

LtCol Paul F. Pugh, USMC. "Operational Art and Amphibious Warfare." *Marine Corps Gazette*, Jul91, pp. 81-85.

LtCol Pugh discusses the operational level of war, and shows how the inherent flexibility of amphibious forces make them ideally suited for a wide range of missions at the operational level.

LCdr A. G. Rankin, RAN, and Lt R. G. Smith, RAN. "Australian Divers Clear Mines." *U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings*, Jul91, pp. 74.

The authors, mine warfare and clearance diving specialists in the Royal Australian Navy, briefly describe the efforts of Clearance Diving Team Three, RAN, during Operation Desert Storm, including preparation for amphibious operations.

Maj N. E. Reynolds, USMCR. "TDG #91-2: Rifle Company Defends in the Desert." *Marine Corps Gazette*, Feb91, pp. 37.

A Tactical Decision game in which the reader is tasked with developing a plan and writing an order for a reinforced rifle company which must defend against a mechanized opponent in a desert region.

Maj. N. E. Reynolds, USMCR et al, "Solutions to TDG #91-2." *Marine Corps Gazette*, Apr91, pp. 70-73.

Contains three different solutions submitted for Tactical Decision Game #91-2.

George Rodrique and Robert Ruby. "Taking Down the Oil Platforms." *U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings*, Apr91, pp. 53.

Two reporters reassess the action taken on January 18, 1991 by the guided missile frigate USS *Nicholas* (FFG 47) and her helicopters which resulted in the capture of Iraqi POWs and the Dorra oilfield off the coast of Kuwait.

Col John C. Scharfen, USMC, (Ret). "The U.S. Marine Corps In 1990." *U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings*, May91, pp. 134-140.

A review of important issues and events affecting the U.S. Marine Corps in 1990, including aviation, sealift, the Maritime Prepositioning Force, roles and missions, operations and exercises, concepts and doctrine, training and education, and manpower.

Gen Norman Schwartzkopf, USA. "A Tribute to the Navy-Marine Corps Team." *U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings*, Aug91, pp. 44.

An excerpt from a speech made by the Commanding General, U.S. Central Command to the U.S. Naval Academy graduating class of 1991. Gen Schwartzkopf praises the admirable performance of U.S. Navy and Marine Corps forces in Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm.

Col Donald R. Selvage, USMC. "Operation Sea Angel: Bangladesh Disaster Relief." *Marine Corps Gazette*, Nov91, pp. 89-97.

Col Selvage commanded Battalion Landing Team 3/5 during Operation Sea Angel, the United States effort to provide humanitarian assistance to Bangladesh after that country was devastated by a typhoon. In this article, he describes how his command adapted their normal organization and techniques to accomplish their humanitarian mission.

Col John M. Shotwell, USMC. "The Fourth Estate as a Force Multiplier." *Marine Corps Gazette*, Jul91, pp. 71-79.

Col Shotwell was the public affairs officer for I MEF during the Persian Gulf conflict. He examines the relationship between the Marine Corps forces and the American news media throughout Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm. Col Shotwell argues that if properly handled, media coverage can be an asset.

BGen Edwin H. Simmons, USMC (Ret). "Getting Marines to the Gulf." *U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings*, May91, pp. 50-64.

The Director of Marine Corps History and Museums puts the deployment of U.S. Marines to the Persian Gulf into its historical context, and reviews in detail the deployment of Marine Corps units to the Persian Gulf up to 15 January 1991.

BGen Edwin H. Simmons, USMC (Ret). "Getting the Job Done." *U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings*, May91, pp. 94-96.

A summary of the role of U.S. Marine forces in Operation Desert Storm.

Capt Arthur M. Smith, MC, USNR, and Col Craig H. Llewellyn, MC, USA, (Ret). "Caring for Our Casualties." *U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings*, Dec91, pp. 72-78.

The authors emphasize the need for selectivity in creating combat medical facilities to care for both the seriously and the less seriously

wounded servicemen. They also stress the need for light surgical and medical facilities stationed far forward to care for the less seriously wounded rather than medical evacuation in order to ensure that as many men as possible are returned to duty. The authors use historical examples from previous wars to illustrate their points.

Cdr Thomas C. Stewart, USNR. "No Gentleman Fliers: a Reservist Looks at the Gulf War and Beyond." *U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings*, Dec91, pp. 91-92.

The commanding officer of Attack Squadron 0686 (VA-0686) reviews the training his reserve unit undertook to maintain readiness and how this training paid off in the successful performance of his unit during Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm. He also used his squadron as an example of the capability of the Naval Air Reserve and reserve units at large to perform well in combat situations.

VAdm James B. Stockdale, USN, (Ret). "POWs: Silence Is Not Golden." *U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings*, Mar91, pp. 29-30.

VAdm Stockdale analyzes the probable present situations of U.S. prisoners of war in Iraq, relating them to his own experiences as an American prisoner during the Vietnam War. He emphasizes the need for prisoners of war to remain stubborn in their resistance against the enemy, to avoid diminishing their sense of honor by refusing to comply with the enemy as much as possible, and to find ways to actively resist their captors.

Maj David W. Szelowski, USMCR. "Iraq's Defense of Kuwait and the Battle of Kursk." *Marine Corps Gazette*, Jan91, pp. 37-39.

The author compares Iraqi defensive preparations in Kuwait during Desert Shield to the Soviet defensive preparations prior to the Battle of Kursk in 1943. Based on this comparison Maj Szelowski offers four courses of action U.S. forces could take to counteract these defense measures.

RAdm J. D. Taylor, USN. "Flights of the Intruders." *U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings*, Mar91, pp. 32.

Writing during the Persian Gulf War, Admiral Taylor contrasts the movie *Flight of the Intruder*, set during Vietnam, with the realities of the air war in Desert Storm. He commends the movie for the accuracy of its portrayal of pilots in combat.

Maj John A. Toolan, Jr., USMC. "Set Condition '1 Alpha' for LCAC Operations." *Marine Corps Gazette*, Aug91, pp. 40-41.

By the Officer in Charge of the 2d Light Armored Infantry Battalion's 4th Marine Expeditionary Brigade detachment. He describes the role of landing craft air cushion (LCACs) in Desert Storm and the lessons learned for future landing plans, crew training, and load stabilization.

LtGen Bernard E. Trainor, USMC (Ret). "On the Gulf War." *Marine Corps Gazette*, Nov91, p.68.

LtGen Trainor writes about how a leader prepares his troops for combat, of the words he chooses, the tone of his message, and of how his words affect his troops as they prepare to meet the enemy.

Maj John E. Valliere, USAF. "Stop Quibbling: Win the War." *U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings*, Dec90, pp. 38-43.

Written while he was a student at Marine Corps Command and Staff College, a C-130 pilot calls for co-operation and understanding among the services and for a concentration on learning how to give the joint commander the means to win in wartime.

Fregattenkapitan Raimund Wallner, German Navy. "Where Were the Germans?" *U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings*, Jun91, pp. 67-68.

By the Deputy Commanding officer of Submarine Squadron 1, German Navy, homeported in Kiel. He reminds his readers that Germany was prevented by its constitution from sending troops to Southwest Asia and was therefore limited to providing financial support and military hardware. He explains that constitutional changes in the newly unified Germany will permit more German response should the day come for any future United Nations actions.

John R. Whiting. "War-Live!" *U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings*, Aug91, pp. 64-66.

Mr. Whiting offers over thirty observations on the role of the media during the Persian Gulf war.

Capt Alan B. Will, USMC. "Supply Support During Desert Storm: A Field Perspective." *Marine Corps Gazette*, Oct91, pp. 42-43.

Capt Will examines some of the shortcomings of the Marine Corps supply system exposed during the Persian Gulf War, and suggests ways that these problems can be eliminated in the future.

1stLt Anthony A. Winicki, USMCR. "The Marine Combined Arms Raid." *Marine Corps Gazette*, Dec91, pp. 54-55.

1stLt Winicki served with the 3d Light Armored Infantry (LAI) Battalion. He describes a number of uses for light armored infantry as part of a combined arms raid, including the ability of the light armored vehicle to designate targets and coordinate supporting arms.

Col John A. Woodhead III, USMC. "Reorganization of the Force Service Support Group." *Marine Corps Gazette*, Nov91, pp. 37-38.

Col Woodhead, chief of staff of the 2d Force Service Support Group (FSSG), argues that experience in SouthWest Asia shows that the present functional arrangement of the FSSG will provide the responsiveness the Corps will need to meet future contingencies.

Col Michael D. Wyly, USMC. "TDG 90-9: The Infantry Company in the Desert." *Marine Corps Gazette*, Dec90, pp. 32-33.

A tactical decision game in which the reader must develop a plan for a reinforced rifle company to defend against an armored attack.

Col Michael D. Wyly, USMC, and Maj Thomas X. Hammes, USMC. "Solutions to TDG #90-9." *Marine Corps Gazette*, Feb91, pp. 31-36.

Solutions to the tactical problem posed above. This exercise was based on the historical experience of Rommel's Afrika Korps in the desert, which used infantry to both protect its own tanks and destroy British armor.



The device reproduced on the back cover is the oldest military insignia in continuous use in the United States. It first appeared, as shown here, on Marine Corps buttons adopted in 1804. With the stars changed to five points this device has continued on Marine Corps buttons to the present day.

